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Abstract 
This thesis examines democratic consolidation in five Eastern European countries. 
The Baltic States have consolidated their democratic regimes but Romania and Bulgaria 
have struggled to do so. I attempt to explain why this has happened. In chapter one, I 
introduce the topic and provide an overview for the next six chapters. 
In the second chapter, I examine the literature that pertains to this topic. The 
literature focuses on several aspects of democratic consolidation. I examine how 
economic growth, privatization, foreign direct investment, modes of transition, violence, 
initial post-communist political contest winner, electoral laws, and the citizenship law all 
play an important role in democratic consolidation. 
In the third chapter, I set up the research design. I use a most similar systems 
design to guide my study. I first establish the guidelines for a consolidated democracy 
and use these guidelines to test each country in the study. I find the Baltic States have 
successfully consolidated their democracies while Romania and Bulgaria have not yet 
consolidated their regimes. 
In chapter four, I examine how privatization and foreign direct investment have 
played roles in the consolidation process. I first examine the economic situations in all 
five countries and then try to understand why the Baltic States have had considerably 
more economic success than the Balkan States. I find that rapid privatization has had a 
positive impact on their economic growth. I then argue that this growth has helped the 
Baltic States to consolidate their regimes while the stagnant economies in Romania and 
Bulgaria have hindered consolidation. 
In chapter five, I demonstrate how transitional factors such as modes of trai-1siticn. 
violence and initial post-rnrnr,1unist pl)litical contest winner have affectcJ democratic 
consolidation. I find that all three factors have aff ectcd consolidation 
Chapter six demonstrates how electoral rules and the citizenship law affects 
democratic consolidation. I examine several aspects of the electoral rules such as which 
electoral system is employed, are any political parties outlawed, and whether thresholds 
are used. I find that a mixed proportional representation system exhibits the most 
desirable attributes. Also, I find that the citizenship law in Estonia and Latvia had a 
significantly negative impact on consolidation. 
Finally, in chapter seven, I discuss how all of the factors combined have 
influenced each countries democratic consolidation efforts. There appears to be two 
interconnected sets of variables. First, the winner of the initial post-communist political 
contest affects privatization policy. Second, the mode of transition appears to have an 
impact on how the electoral rules will be set up. In the end, I find that there is not one 
variable that leads to democratic consolidation but several. 
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In November 2002, seven Eastern European countiies were invited to join 
NATO. This would have been unheard of thirteen years ago. Since the Cold War ended, 
growing integration between Eastern Europe and the West has had a significant impact 
on the new regimes. Yet this growing integration has not shown a consistent effect on all 
of the new regimes. Some transitions toward consolidating democracy in Eastern Europe 
have flourished while others have suffered. It is important to understand why these 
results have varied to such a degree. 
Since the end of the cold war, most of the Eastern European states have attempted 
a democratic transition but the success has varied from country to country. The US and 
many other Western states are encouraging this movement toward democracy, among 
other reasons, because it is believed that democratic countries have better relations with 
each other than they do with authoritarian regimes. If this is true, it is important to know 
and understand what variables help foster democratic growth in these aspiring 
democracies. If these variables can be isolated, then it may be possible to facilitate 
movement toward more democratic governments. In this paper, I wish to examine this 
very concept. One major concern with this question is the vast number of possible 
variables. Therefore I am limiting this study to specific variables that can help influence 
future government policy. It would be valuable to know if certain historical and cultural 
specific variables can influence democratization in some manner but since, by their very 
nature, they are not controllable, and little if any policy can be created to use these 
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variables in a positive manner. Therefore, this study will only examine' ariables th:lt be 
can be controlled. 
In this study, I will compare the transitions toward democracy by the Baltic States 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with Romania and Bulgaria. I believe that these five 
countries present an interesting study because they have similar legacies but have 
experienced different results. The Baltic States have been the most progressive states that 
comprised the old Soviet Union, while Romania and Bulgaria have been some of the 
slowest liberalizing countries in Eastern Europe (Fontaine, 1996). It appears that the 
Baltic States have experienced more success in consolidating their democracies than 
Romania and Bulgaria. This appears unusual since the Baltic States, like all of the 
former Soviet Republics, had very strong ties with Russia. They were part of the Soviet 
Union while Romania and Bulgaria were able to have control over their own 
governments. This could indicate that Romania and Bulgaria should have had an easier 
time adjusting to the break up of the Soviet Union and possible closer ties to the West. 
Besides this one major difference, these counties do share many traits. 
First, all five countries are a product of the Warsaw Pact, which was led by the 
Soviet Union. This impact that the Soviet system had on all its countries is a unique 
quality in itself. It created similar legacies for all countries involved. Second, all five are 
attempting to transition their governments from a communist regime to a more 
democratic government. It is also important to note that all five countries are already 
considered democratic. Yet the Baltic States have been considered by many to have 
consolidated their democratic regimes, while Romania and Bulgaria are still in process of 
consolidating their democracies. Finally, they all have major ethnic division in their 
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populations. In a way, this comparaii\e study is examining the most ~;;uccessful countries 
in democratic consolidation from the former Soviet Union and its satellites and 
comparing it with two of the least successful. I wish to understand why this situation has 
occurred. 
In my following chapters, I examine several variables in an attempt to understand 
why the Baltic States are more successful. In chapter two, I revie'vv the literature to 
familiarize the reader with the current research and debates in this area of study. In 
chapter three, I discuss the methodological approach of this paper but I also demonstrate 
that the Baltic States have had more success in consolidating their democracy. In chapter 
four, I examine how different levels of economic growth and how different approaches to 
privatization may have effected the situation. In chapter five, I examine the details of the 
transition itself. These details include the mode of transition, if the transition was violent, 
and whether the communist or opposition forces won the initial post-communist political 
contest. In chapter six, I demonstrate how certain institutional differences can have an 
impact on the consolidation efforts of each country. I examine both the electoral Jaws 
and citizenship laws. I also examine whether or not extremist parties such as communist, 
fascist, or ethnic based parties were outlawed. I conclude the study in chapter seven by 




Re·view of the Literature 
There are many scholars who have written on transitions to democracy. Yet, most 
of the studies focus on certain aspects that influence this process such as different paths 
toward democracy, important underlying factors that are necessary for democracy to 
develop, differing modes of transition from authoritarian rule to a democratic regime, the 
impact of institutional factors and important aspects of a countries social and political 
history that may affect its ability to become democratic. Due to the limited size and 
scope of this paper, only certain aspects of the transition can be studied. I want to 
examine aspects that can be controlled by these potential democracies. This being said, 
one major school in "consolidationology" will be beyond the scope of this paper. The 
historical legacies approach has an important place in the field but will not be examined 
in this study. Instead I examine three key areas of study that can be controlled for. These 
variables may be helpful to future countries that attempt to liberalize their regimes. Yet, it 
is important to note, as Rustow (1970, p.346) did, "the factors that keep a democracy 
stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence." Therefore, I examine this from 
the angle of how these three factors affect consolidation of the regime rather than the 
initial democratic transformation. 
Economic factors 
The first factor that I examine in this study involves the importance of economic 
development. Much of the work done on economic development has been done in the 
realm of Modernization Theory. The basic premise for Modernization Theory is that 
certain advancements in society lead to the creation of a democratic society. Lipset 
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( 1959) was the first to address the importance of socioeconomic development on 
democratization. He concludes, "Economic development involving industrialization, 
urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of 
the society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy (Lipset, 1959, p. 86)." He 
maintains that socioeconomic development is necessary for the establishment and 
maintenance of a democratic political system. Further research in this area of study 
found a strong correlation between levels of economic development and consolidated 
democracy (Coleman, 1960; Coulter, 1975; Cutright, 1963; Cutright and Wiley, 1969; 
Smith, 1969; Dahl, 1998; and Huntington, 1991). Other studies found that an increase in 
economic output at the lower stages of economic development also leads to increases in 
the level of democracy (Neubauer, 1967; and Jackman, 1973). Yet despite all of this 
positive research Rustow (1970) makes a major point by claiming that correlation is not 
causation. This suggests that democratic development and economic development are 
connected but it has not been proven which causes the other. Arat (1988) finds that the 
key to-all of this research is that economic development is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of democratic development. Other research in this area also finds that 
maintaining this economic development helps maintain the state's legitimacy and helps to 
consolidate the democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1978). Therefore, from this research we 
find that democratic development and economic development are somehow correlated 
but it is still inconclusive to which causes the other. Yet, it does seem apparent that 
economic progress can help consolidate a young democracy. Since economic 
development appears to be a significant factor in democratic development and 
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consolidation, it is important to understand how privatization affects democratic 
development. 
Over the last fifteen years, a significant amount of research has been generated on 
privatization and how it affects aspiring democracies. One argument suggests that there 
are short-term tensions, which develop between economic and political liberalization. 
These scholars claim that opponents of economic liberalization could build coalitions 
against new democratic regimes (Nelson, 1989; Kurtz and Barnes, 2002). Some scholars 
suggest that the best course of action is to undemocratically implement privatization 
methods to solve this problem. They claim that it may circumvent the democratic 
process temporarily but it is a good risk since market economics are presumed to provide 
the best basis for democratic growth (Bunce, 1995; Williamson, 1994). 
Yet, in recent studies, some scholars have argued that no circumvention of 
democracy is necessary in post communist countries, even for a brief period of time. 
These scholars claim that the post-communist countries are different and that initial 
democratic elections are likely to put economic liberals in power. After taking power, a 
honeymoon period would take place, giving the liberals enough time to complete the 
process without harming the democratic reforms (Bunce, 1995; de Melo, Denizer, and 
Gelb, 1996b; Diamond, 1995; Fish, 1998a; Fish, 1998b). They claim that this economic 
liberalization should provide a foundation for vibrant, independent, associational life. 
Bunce (1999) also claims that when new economic institutions are introduced quickly, it 
cuts sharply into the economic privileges of the communist elite. Yet others have 
suggested that privatization was not a positive influence in the consolidation of the 
democracies of post-communist countries (Kurtz and Barnes, 2002; Clark, 2000; Cui, 
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1997). No one study has shown iJTefutable result~ :o end this debate. Further research is 
necessary before this debate is concluded. Yet this does not complete our examination of 
the economic issue. 
The study of foreign direct investment (FDI) into post-communist countries has 
been substantial. FDI has been increasingly seen as one of the most important ways to 
stimulate growth ii, an economy (Marsh, 2000; Clark, 2000). In a recent study, Laski 
(1998) found a positive relationship between FDI and the economic stabilization of the 
economy. If FDI investment is so important for economic growth and stability, then it is 
important to know what helps FDI growth in a country. From the literature, it appears 
that by far, the most influential factor in determining FDI inflow into a post-communist 
country is the general success and development of the privatization process (Beyer, 2002; 
Djarova, 1999; Economic Bulletin for Europe, 1994; Fabry and Zeghni, 2002; Lankes 
and Stem, 1998; Marsh, 2000; Meyer and Pind, 1999; Resmini, 2000; Schusselbauer, 
1999; Melich, 2000). 
Transitional factors 
While it is apparent that economic variables are important for democratic 
consolidation, economics alone does not appear to be the answer. Another area of 
research that I feel is important and that may affect democratic consolidation are key 
factors that took place at the time of transition. Some of these path dependent variables 
are the mode of transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one, whether the 
transition was violent, and whether the communists maintained power after the transition. 
These three factors at the time of transition may influence the consolidation efforts of 
these countries. 
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The amount of literatu!."e on the mode of transition from an al!thoritarian regim.:! to 
a democratic one is significant. The modes of transition are usually distinguished by 
examining and categorizing the methods in \Vhich the incumbent regime is replaced by 
the opposition forces (Mun ck and Leff, 1997). Huntington (1991) discusses three distinct 
types of transitions: transitions from above (transformation/transaction/reform), from 
below (replacement/breakdown/rupture), and transition where both incumbent and 
opposition play major roles in transforming the system (transplacement/extrication). 
Transformation occurs when elites presently in power take charge and lead the transition 
process. Replacement is when the opposition groups take the lead in the transition. 
Huntington maintains that the transplacement method, which is when the government and 
opposition work together to change the system, seems to be the most beneficial for 
democratic consolidation. Munck and Leff (1997) come to a similar conclusion when 
they examine the mode of transition and elite competition. 
Dahl (1998) argues that a disproportionately large number of consolidated 
democracies have come out of peaceful evolutions as opposed to violent revolutions. 
Huntington believes that any kind of violent regime change will have a negative effect on 
the future consolidation of the democracy. Karl and Schmitter (1991) follow a similar 
line of thinking when they suggest that the most successful transitions come about 
through a pact between the opposition and the present ruling regime in which the 
incumbent ruling party remains partly in control of political development for the political 
regime. Welsh (1994) also notes that how the bargaining between elites takes place is 
crucial. She claims that if there is an absence of or failure in bargaining efforts, then this 
may impede democratic consolidation efforts. Yet, in a recent study, Kurtz and Barnes 
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(2002) find that violence docs not appear to be an important variable in consolidation 
efforts. 
Several authors (Kunz and Barnes, 2002; Fish, 1998b; Hanson, 1998; Welsh, 
1994; Ishiyama, 1997) have noted the importance of the initial post-communist political 
contest. They argue its imp01tance to the future of the regime is implicit since the group 
that wins the initial elections will determine the institutional rules under which future 
competition will take place. They suggest that if the opposition forces win the first 
contest, then conditions for the establishment of a consolidated democracy should be 
propitious. Yet, an initial victory by the communist successor parties would have 
negative effects on the consolidation efforts. Kurtz and Barnes (2002) find a statistically 
significant relationship that supports this argument. 
Electoral rules 
It does appear that factors at the time of transition can play an important role in 
the consolidation efforts but there is one more issue that I wish to examine. This issue 
involves how certain aspects of the electoral system and rules governing the scope of 
participation can cause or solve major problems that threaten democratic consolidation. 
(Ishiyama, 1997) For this study that I wish to examine several aspects of the electoral 
system such the type (PR, first past the post, or mixed), whether certain kinds of parties 
are outlawed, effects of thresholds, and citizenship laws. Electoral laws are very 
important for not only can they help create and maintain political stability if used 
correctly, they are also much easier for politicians to manipulate. It is much easier to 
manipulate them than overhaul the entire political system (Santori, 1968). The electoral 
laws can have a major impact on the consolidation process when societies have major 
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ethnic cleavages. It can heighten or reduce ethnic conflict depending: on how the sy~tem 
is organized (Duchacek, 1977; Horowitz, 1985). One of the strongest areas of debate is 
over which electoral rules are more apt to promote political stability in divided new 
democracies. There are two dimensions to this debate; one involves the scope of 
representation or the extent to which representation is commensurate with political 
divisions in society. The other area of debates involves the quality of representation 
(Nordlinger, 1968; Covell, 1985). The debate centers on whether expanded 
representation is beneficial or detrimental in ethnically divided states. One group 
contends that representing groups proportionally facilitates ethnic integration into the 
political system, thus creating conditions for inter-ethnic cooperation (Lijphart, 1974; 
Lijphart, 1977; Nordlinger, 1972; McRae, 1974; Daalder, 1971; Lorwin, 1971). This 
group favors representative structures like proportional representation (PR) electoral 
systems because they prevent the consistent denial of representation for major minority 
groups (Lijphart, 1985; Lijphart, 1986; Lakeman, 1974). They claim that majoritarian 
representative structures are inappropriate in ethnically divided societies because they 
exclude major minority groups, which can result in violence and democratic collapse 
(Lijphart, 1977). 
Yet, critics argue that PR systems can lead to extremist parties or anti-system 
ethnic parties intent on the destruction of the democracy. They also claim that there is no 
reason to believe that such parties will moderate their demands once they receive 
proportional representation (Barry, 1975; Horowitz, 1985). 
The other dimension of the debate examines the quality of the representation. 
Brass (1991) argues that the promotion of individual competition and an individually 
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based system of representation would diffuse ethnic conflict because it promotes creating 
issue based parties rather than ethnic ones. There may not be a clear consensus en which 
electoral system seems to promote democracy stability and consolidation in ethnically 
divided states but there is an agreement that they can and do affect the situation 
(Ishiyama, 1999; Ishiyama, 1996). 
One way to create stability in this possibly volatile party system is to create legal 
thresholds. In a PR system, this is the percentage of the vote that the party must attain in 
order to receive representation. Any percentage below this and the party is denied a seat 
(Lijphart, 1994; Lijphart, 1999). Thresholds reduce the number of parties in system by 
weeding out the smaller parties (Lijphart, 1986). If there are a large number of parties in 
a system, it can be considered fractionalized. It is more difficult to maintain a 
fractionalized coalition government than one that has two or three parties involved (Rae, 
1967; Lijphart, 1999). Therefore, thresholds can help create stability in the party system. 
In regards to the citizenship law, several authors (Roeder, 1999; Cichock, 2002) 
have noted how too restrictive citizenship laws can have a negative effect on ethnic 
integration. These laws can lead to political instability due to disenfranchisement of 
ethnic minorities and may even threaten democratic consolidation. 
It is apparent that several factors have an impact on the success on democratic 
consolidation. I use three major areas of research to study why consolidate takes hold in 






This thesis will use a most similar ;,ystems design to guide the research. 
Prezeworski and Teune (1970) s.uggest that most similar system designs are useful 
because they help eliminate variables that the cases have in common. In this study, all 
five countries have similar legacies from a communist past, all five are attempting to 
transition their governments from a communist regime to a more democratic government, 
all have experienced some degree of success in democratizing, and all have major ethnic 
divisions in their populations. First, democracy will be defined for the confines of this 
paper and then the five countries will be measured to determine levels of democratic 
consolidation. As noted above, these five countries had many attributes in common when 
they began their transitions toward democracy, but have experienced varying degrees of 
success toward this goal. While all five countries have experienced success towards 
democratization, I try to explain why the Baltic States appear to have been more 
successful in consolidating their democracy than have the two Balkan States. 
I use three explanatory variables when examining this situation. The first 
variables I examine involve economic factors such as overall well being of the economy, 
measured by GDP, speed of privatization and FDI. These variables help demonstrate 
how the condition of the economy can influence consolidation. In the second set of 
variables, I investigate influential factors that took place at the time of transition. These 
variables include mode of transition, violence, and which party had control immediately 
after the transition. This set of variables demonstrates the importance of transitional 
factors. The third variable I examine involves institutional concepts such as how the 
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electoral law and citizenship laws play a role in helping or hindering consolidation 
df0rts. Different electoral rules can influence consolidation so these variables will also 
be examined. 
Since a part of my argument claims that the Baltic States have consolidated their 
democratic regimes more quickly than Romania or Bulgaria, I must demonstrate this to 
be true. But before I do this, a working definition of democracy must first be realized. 
Requirements for democracy 
I use several criteria to evaluate the democratic level of consolidation in each 
country. I use six political factors that Dahl (1998) claims large-scale consolidated 
democracies require and have added two other institutional requirements (control of the 
military and election legitimacy) to evaluate democratic levels of consolidation. 
• Elected officials- representatives from the bodied politic that are elected by the 
citizens of that country to make government decisions. 
• Free, fair, and frequent elections- elected officials are chosen frequently and fairly by 
the citizens of that country in which coercion is uncommon. 
• Freedom of expression- citizens have the right to express themselves in any way 
without fear of punishment from the government. 
• Access to alternative sources of information- citizens have the right to seek out 
information through any publication that is not under the control of the government. 
• Associational autonomy- citizens have the right to gather and form independent 
groups, which the government has no control over. 
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• Inclusive citizenship- no adult permanently residing in the country and subject to its 
laws can be denied the rights that are afforded to every other citizen. Every citizen, 
including elected officials, is subject to rule of law. 
• Control over the military- elected officials have full control over all military action. 
• Election legitimacy - when a previously elected official is not reelected, then he/she 
must not try to retain power. Coup attempts are a reflection of a lack of election 
legitimacy. 
If these eight criteria are met, then a country will be judged to have a consolidated 
democracy. All of these political institutions are necessary, if not sufficient, for a 
successful democracy. 
Evaluating the five countries 
When evaluating these countries democratic consolidation process, much of the 
data was collected from the Freedom House website. This is a widely respected and 
credible judge of the democratization process. The democratic ratings for 2003 
demonstrate that the Baltic States have had more success in consolidating their 
democratic governments than Bulgaria or Romania. Freedom House examines two major 
issues, democratization (DEM) and rule of law (ROL). The DEM score is calculated by 
taking the average of the electoral process (EP), civil society (CS), independent media 
(IM), and governance (GOV) scores. The ROL score is determined by averaging the 
constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework (CLJF) score with the corruption (CO) 
score. 1 
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T bl 3 1 2003 t . a e ~. - score summary or c~~ 
1 Country EP cs IM GOV DEM CLJF co RO~ 
Bulgaria 2.00 3.25 3.50 3.75 3.13 3.50 4.25 3.88 I 
Estonia 1.75 2.00 1.75 2.25 1.94 1.75 2.50 2.13 
Latvia 1.75 2.00 1.75 2.25 1.94 2.25 3.50 2.88 
Lithuania 1.75 1.50 1.75 2.50 1.88 1.75 3.50 2.63 
Romania 2.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 3.25 4.25 4.50 4.38 
- Source- Freedom House-Nations in Transit 2003. 
It is quite obvious that the Baltic States have a clear advantage in both areas of 
democratization and rule of law. 
The 3.13 Dem rating for Bulgaria was generally understood to be caused by their 
problems with inexperienced local leaders, interest groups, and a lack of an independent 
media (Nations in Transit, 2001). Bulgaria has been successful in meeting many of 
criteria for a consolidated democracy such as election legitimacy, elected officials, free, 
fair, and frequent elections, and for the most part, inclusive citizenship and freedom of 
expression. Freedom House suggests that Bulgaria has no problems with control of the 
military, yet some residual civil-military relations problems do exist (Nelson, 2002). Yet 
they have not cause major problems involving democratic consolidation. Bulgaria has 
had some problems with meeting the requirements for inclusive citizenship. This has 
been that in the past, elected officials enjoyed many special privileges during the 
privatization process. Also, corrupt political officials have wielded political power to 
avoided prosecution (Munck and Leff, 1997). Reports of religious harassment, minority 
discrimination, and minority harassment by local police have also been a problem 
(Nations in Transit, 2001). 
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The problems with associational autonomy derive directly from the constitutiorn"<l 
Jaw that claims that citizens do not have a right to form parties based on ethnic, religious, 
or racial principals. Even though this lav exists, a Bulgarian Turk party has been 
allowed to remain while the constitutional court has disbanned both Roma and 
Macedonian ethnic parties (Nations in Transit, 2001). 
The other primary problem is that the Bulgarian government dominates the 
broadcast media. Most print media is in private hands but the government has constantly 
attempted (ineffectively) to dictate to the media. Other problems such as corruption, 
partisan clientelism, and judicial ineffectiveness have affected the rule of law in Bulgaria 
(Nations in Transit, 2001). This is why they received a 3.88 for ROL. Part of this 
problem starts with the interest groups. There is no legal regulation of them so 
corporativism and clientelism can heavily influence policy. Also, the court system has 
had major problems involving lack of judges, which has created a slow and ineffective 
judiciary. In 2002, Transparency International ranked Bulgaria 45th out of 105 countries 
in its corruption percentage index (Transparency International, 2002). 2 Corruption has 
been a problem in Bulgaria but it has begun to improve. 
Romania has created successful political institutions in several areas. They have 
established successful political institutions in the areas of election legitimacy, elected 
officials, and some effectiveness in the other political institutions. I question the 
legitimacy of free, fair, frequent elections and also the legitimacy of freedom of 
expression because Romania has been known to use violence as a way of expressing their 
political beliefs (Roper, 2002). This violence is a form of coercion. This acceptance of 
using violence for political means started with the fall of the communist regime in1989 
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and h3s been a common and accepted practice since then. Civilian control of tr,;? military 
has not been a problem but some problems still exist with the civil-military relationship 
(Nelson, 2002). Yet, like Bulgaria, they have not cause major problems involving 
democratic consolidation. Another problem in this area is the problem of a weak 
opposition. The opposition to the former communist party is weak and unorganized. 
Due to this weak opposition, the Romanian regime has materialized into a one-party 
dominant system. This severely weakens the democratic process in Romania. 
Romania does a fairly good job of representing the minorities in their country but 
it has a problem with rule of law. International human rights associations have 
documented several detentions of citizens without warrants and beatings of detainees. 
Also, under the constitution, property rights are protected but not guaranteed (Nations in 
Transit, 2002). Freedom of religion is guaranteed in the Romanian constitution but the 
communist party confiscated some belongings of the Greek Catholic Church and these 
items have not yet been returned (Nations in Transit, 2002). Also, corruption is rampant 
in Romania. That is why their rule of law rate for 2003 is 4.38. In 2002, Transparency 
International ranked Romania 77th out of 105 countries in its corruption percentage index 
(Transparency International, 2002). "Corruption is probably the most significant political 
issue currently under active political debate (Nations in Transit, 2002, p. 324)." 
Estonia also has some problems with corruption but its problems are in no way as 
significant as Romania's corruption issues. In fact, Estonia is considered the least corrupt 
former Soviet/Eastern European country. They were ranked 29th out 105 countries in 
Transparency International's 2002 Corruption Index, which is the best among Eastern 
European and former Soviet countries (Transparency International, 2002). Still they have 
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had some problems \Vi th corruption. Bribery of the loca.l civil servants is fairly common 
but not nearly as bad as in most Eastern European countries. Also customs and borde: 
guards have been cited as being particularly vulnerable to corruption (Nations in Transit, 
2002). There were also some concerns about corruption among high-level officials. One 
of the ways in which they have tried to counter this was by implementing several policies 
that increased the transparency of government spending, government activities, and the 
financial assets of the public officials. It seems that one of the biggest differences 
between Romania and Estonia on the issue of corruption is that Estonia is actively trying 
to reduce its corruption levels while the Romania government seems more apathetic to 
problem. 
All of the other political institutions are all established in Estonia. The political 
system has been remarkably stable for the last ten years and a consensus among most of 
the political elites about democratic reform has allowed Estonia to implement some of the 
most extensive political and economic reform in the former Soviet Union (Nations in 
Transit, 2002). They have stable control over military, strong election legitimacy, meet 
the requirements for elected officials and free, fair and frequent elections. The 
government respects the basic freedoms of the press, speech, and organization. Estonia 
has a variety of independent media sources. In fact, there are so many privately owned 
daily newspapers that competition has driven many into financial difficulties. Estonia 
also has several privately owned radio and television stations. The state has very little 
control over the media and none of the newspapers or other media centers receive 
government subsidies (Nations in Transit, 2002). Finally, they have also done a very 
good job meeting the requirements of inclusive citizenship. All adult citizens of Estonia 
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have the right to run for political office and vote in elections. Noncitizens do not have 
the right to run for office in Estonia but after they have resided in the municipality for 
five years, they can vote in local elections (Nations in Transit, 2002). Estonia meets ail 
the standards of a consolidated democracy and it has been more successful at this process 
than most former Soviet countries. 
Latvia has had major success in consolidating its democracy, which is 
demonstrated by its 1.94 DEM score. It meets all eight requirements for a consolidated 
democracy and has a multi-party system that appears very stable. It is so stable that 
extremist parties have almost no influence on politics in Latvia. Another example of 
their stability is demonstrated by the lack of a single dominant political party (Nations in 
Transit, 2002). Political parties are well-established but center-right and center-left 
wing parties form coalitions in parliament since no one party dominates on either the 
right or left. Elections revolve around leaders and issues, not political parties, which are 
not very active until elections are close (Nations in Transit, 2002). 
Like Estonia, freedom of the press is well established in Latvia. There are some 
state owned media outlets but the private section dominates the industry (Nations in 
Transit, 2002). The Constitution provides for freedom of religion and is generally 
respected but some minority religions, considered new religions, have faced problems 
regarding exemptions from military services. 
One of the main issues that Latvia has recently addressed is the citizenship law. 
All non-ethnic Latvia citizens enjoy the same rights and privileges of ethnic Latvian 
citizens but over 20 percent of the population still remains noncitizens (Cichock, 2002). 
In recent years, the Latvian government has eased naturalization requirements but the 
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language law, apathy, a Jack of infonnation about the process, and mistrust of the 
government has been the main barriers of naturalization. There are seven major ethnic 
minorities in Latvia but the largest, by far. is the Russian minority (Cichock, 2002). The 
naturalization process meets all EU standards and is not discriminatory (Nations in 
Transit, 2002). 
The only other major issue in Latvia is conuption. This is a major problem and is 
main reason why Latvia's ROL score is 2.88. Latvia has had a major problem with what 
the World Bank terms "state capture" (Nations in Transit, 2002). This is where laws 
created by the legislature and various ministries are created to benefit a narrow range of 
private sector groups and individuals. The phenomenon reduces the influence of ordinary 
citizens in day-to-day politics. The Latvian government has tried to address the 
corruption issue with several laws with some success. They were ranked 52nd out of 105 
countries in Transparency International' s 2002 Corruption Index, which is an 
improvement from last year (Transparency International, 2002). 
Lithuania has also had major success in consolidating its democracy. The 1.88 
DEM scores helps demonstrate this point. It is a very stable multi-party system. They 
meet all eight conditions for a consolidated democracy with only minor problems in 
inclusive citizenship (corruption) and Associational autonomy (religion). The vast 
majority of the mass media are privately owned and internet availability is steadily 
expanding (Nations in Transit, 2002). They easily met such requirements as free, fair, 
and frequent elections, elected officials, election legitimacy, freedom of expression, 
alternative sources of information, and control over the military. One problem has been 
some religious discrimination in Lithuania. The government recognizes nine major 
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religions as traditional. Only these religions and state-recognized religions (this is long 
and diffic~lt process) are allowed to teach religion in state schools and buy land to build 
churches (Nations in Transit, 2002). These religions also receive financial benefits such 
as a reduction of certain taxes and reception of state subsides. 
There is also a problem with the transparency of government in Lithuania. Laws 
are often adopted without piior notice or public scrutiny and cabinet sessions take place 
behind closed doors. The Parliament is more open than the cabinet but it is not obligated 
to inform the public or the media of its work (Nations in Transit, 2002). This process has 
been combined with an outrageous number of laws and decrees from Parliament and 
several flaws in Lithuania's Constitution that attempted to provide a separation of 
executive and legislative powers (Nations in Transit, 2002; Vardys and Slaven, 1996). 
Besides some of these problems, which the government has been attempting to address, 
Lithuania has a thriving democracy. 
There have been some issues involving corruption as well. In fact, corruption has 
been an increasing problem in Lithuania. The government has made some attempts to 
correct the problem but it has not been as aggressive as Estonia or Latvia. One of the 
biggest problems is bribery of civil servants, police officers, and custom officers. Much 
of the problem derives from the regulatory authority interpreting, applying, and enforcing 
regulations inconsistently. Many of the regulatory obligations are vaguely defined or 
changed frequently so this leaves this area open for major corruption (Nations in Transit, 
2002). The 2.63 ROL score reinforces the significant corruption problem that Lithuania 
is facing. They were ranked 36th out 105 countries in Transparency International' s 2002 
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Conuption Index, which is a slight improvement from last years ranking (Transparency 
International, 2002). 
After examining the present state of these democracies, it is apparent that the 
Baltic States have had greater success in consolidated democracy while Bulgaria and 
Romania are still in the process of this. Yet, when evaluating these five countries, it is 
not only important to examine how democratic they are presently but to also examine 
them from a year to year basis to demonstrate the democratic progress that each state has 
made since the transition. This is important since I am arguing that the Baltic States have 
achieved this goal more quickly. To do this, I will use Freedom House country ratings 
for the democratization effort and rule of law scores in each country from 1997-2003. 
Table 3.2- Freedom House ratings from 1997-2003 
Country 1997 1998 1999-2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bulgaria 3.90, na 3.55, na 3.31, 4.13 3.06, 4.13 3.00, 4.00 3.13, 3.88 
Estonia 2.10, na 2.05, na 2.06, 2.63 2.00, 2.38 1.94, 2.13 1.94, 2.13 
Latvia 2.15,na 2.15,na 2.06, 2.75 1.94, 2.75 1.94, 2.88 1.94, 2.88 
Lithuania 2.15,na 1.95, na 2.00, 2.88 1.94, 2.75 1.88, 2.88 1.88, 2.63 
Romania 3.95, na 3.85, na 3.19, 4.25 3.31, 4.38 3.31,4.50 3.25, 4.38 
-First score is DEM, second is ROL. Ex (DEM, ROL), na means not available 
-source- Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2003 and Nations in Transit, 2002 
It is obvious that the Baltic States had a quick start toward democratization, which 
enabled them to consolidate their democracy more quickly than Romania or Bulgaria. If 
this is the case, then what allowed this to happen? What factors influenced this? I 
examine three important possibilities that could have influenced this difference. 
The first of these variables I examine are the different economic situations that 
each country was in. More specifically, I examine how GDP growth tied with 
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ptivatization and FDI can affect the situation As noted earlier, a strong economy and 
democratization are strongly correlated. If these variables had a major impact on the 
consolidation process, then I would expect the Baltic Stati;:s to not only have a much 
higher GDP per-capita but to have also privatized much more quickly than Romania and 
Bulgaria. If the Baltic States did privatize more quickly, than I expect that they would 
also receive large increases in the amount of FDI invested in their countries. This would 
help democratic growth, which, in tum, would help democratic consolidation. 
Since privatization of major industries is an important factor, it is essential to 
define privatization. "Privatization originally meant the sale or liquidation of productive 
assets owned by the state (Thomas, 1993, p.168)." When referring to post-Communist 
privatization, the concept has taken on several other usages such as: selling the business 
and leasing the land and fixed assets; leasing the business; sell, leasing, or giving away 
some or all of the assets in the enterprise to management or workers; retaining 
government ownership of a large minority interest; stripping away viable assets for sale 
or giveaway; giving to all adult, for no or nominal cost, vouchers that can be used to bid 
for shares of a public factory; hiring foreigners to run holding companies for citizen-
owners; or even the sale of some factories to highest the bidder. Yet it hardly ever means 
liquidation of large industries (Thomas, 1993). The key is that the state devolves power 
of the industry/enterprise into the hands of private owners. FDI is defined as investors 
from outside the state purchasing an industry/enterprise or at the minimum a portion of it. 
The second variable I investigate involves factors of the transition. I examine 
three possible contributing factors in this chapter. First, I examine the mode of transition 
defined by Huntington (1991). I expect that if a state uses the transplacement method to 
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change its regime type, then they should consolidate more quickly ~han others that use a 
different method. Second, I examine whether the transition was violent and expect a 
violent transition to hinder democratic growth. Finally, I examine the initial post-
communist contest. If the former communist party gains power directly after the 
transition I expect this to have a negative effect on consolidation efforts. Since the group 
that wins the initial elections will determine the institutional rules under which future 
competition will take place, the initial winner will have extraordinary influence on 
creation of the new system. The literature suggests that if the opposition forces win the 
first contest, then conditions for the establishment of a consolidated democracy should be 
propitious. Yet, an initial victory by the communist successor parties would have 
negative effects on the consolidation efforts. 
The final variable that I examine is the possible institutional differences in each 
country. This chapter will look at the different effects of electoral rules and laws. These 
institutions can help create stability for a blossoming democracy but they can also hinder 
its growth. Several authors have noted that the kind of electoral system can have an 
impact on the stability of a fledgling democracy. Much of the literature favors the PR 
system so I expect that PR systems will have positive impact on consolidation efforts. 
Since Barry (1975) and Horowitz (1985) mention that PR systems can create a situation 
in which extremist parties may develop I also expect that restrictions on communist and 
fascist anti-democratic parties will have a positive effect on consolidating these new 
regimes. These groups are anti-democratic and will try to bring down the regime so it 
would not be wise to allow them to operate in the system. Yet I expect the outlawing 
ethnic based parties to have a negative affect on consolidation. The reason why PR 
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systems arc ~·avored in ethnically divided societies is due to its ability to represent 
minorities. Outlawing ethnic based parties would eliminate this unique trait. 
With regard to thresholds on PR systems, Rae (1967) and Lijphart (1999) noted 
how they can help bring stability to the party system which can have a positive impact on 
consolidation. I would expect that these restrictions would help consolidation. 
Finally, I examine the citizenship Jaws. All five countries have significant 
proportions of ethnic minorities in their populations but this should only be a significant 
factor in Baltic States. Since the Baltic States are not only are transforming to 
democracy but are also recreating their own countries, citizenship to these new countries 
should have an impact on democratic consolidation. If these minorities are denied 
specific rights or if the standards to become a legal citizen are too difficult, then certain 
groups may not be represented in society. This would hurt a countries democratic 
credibility and would not enable it to fully consolidate the regime. 
1 For a complete explanation of Freedom House rankings, go to FreedomHouse.org 





Explanatory Variable 1 
Economic Conditions 
One of the most widely studied variables for political transformation has been the 
importance of the economic condition of the state. Starting with modernization theory, 
most scholars find a strong correlation between strong economies and strong democratic 
values in those societies. No one study has shown whether a strong economy causes 
democracies to form or whether democracies create strong economies but none the less, 
there does appear to be a strong relationship between the two. Recently, a strong debate 
has occurred over the importance of privatization and whether it helps foster democratic 
growth. Some theorists maintain that rapid privatization helps foster democratic growth 
(Bunce, 1995; de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb, 1996b; Diamond, 1995; Fish, 1998a; Fish, 
1998b) while others believe that it hinders it (Kurtz and Barnes, 2002; Clark, 2000; Cui, 
1997). While both sides have valid arguments, I believe my study offers evidence in 
support of rapid privatization. 
My main contentions are not only that rapid privatization would help stabilize an 
unstable economy, which by itself would create growth and legitimacy for the regime, 
but that it would also increase foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. The increase in 
FDI would also inject important financial inflows into these economies. FDI has been 
shown to be increasingly important as a major way to stimulant growth (Marsh 2000). 
This means that FDI could help foster a time of strong economic growth in the region. 
Other scholars have found a positive relationship between FDI and the economic 
stabilization of the economy (Laski, 1998). These two factors of increased monetary 
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inflow and strengthening the economy would create GDP growth, and hence stability and 
legitimacy for the consolidating regime. I intend to demonstrate that the favorable 
economic choices made by the Baltic States enhanced their ability to consolidate their 
democracies. 
I examine both the GDP rates of the five countries and their r<Jies of privatization. 
I also examine FDI inflows to demonstrate that rapid privatization increases it. I expect 
that the Baltic States should have privatized faster, which in tum would help with GDP 
growth. This boost in GDP then helps promote legitimacy to the transforming 
democracies. Therefore, rapid privatization would induce growth and help the Baltic 
States consolidate their democracies more rapidly. 
GDP 
Table 4.1 
GDP per capita 
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Estonia 1085 1530 2417 2980 3174 3617 3609 3509 3686 
Latvia 827 1442 1779 2071 2293 2494 2799 3019 3249 
Lithuania 715 1143 1623 2129 2588 2904 2882 3064 3249 
Bulgaria 1280 1152 1563 1179 1230 1490 1513 1484 1619 
Romania 1323 1564 1563 1565 1859 1563 1644 1743 
After examining Table 4.1, it appears that the Baltic States presently have a 
stronger economy. A closer look reveals that the Baltic States actually had a weaker 
economy in 1993 but by 1996, all three Baltic States had made major gains in their 
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economies \Vhile Bulgaria's and Romania's economics either remainect relativelv 
~ , 
stagnant or decreased. While the Baltic St:ites have almost quadrupled their economics 
over the past ten years, Romania and Bulgaria have only recently started to show some 
signs of growth. The explanation for this difference may lie in diverging privatization 
policies. 
Privatization Efforts and FDI inflows 
Estonia 
The Estonian government is in the final stages of completing its privatization 
programs. Small-scale privatization actually started before Estonia was independent. It 
had its first private bank as early as December 1988. In early 1992, it adopted a pilot 
policy to privatize seven companies. Other major legislation followed such as: the 1991 
Law on the Fundamental of Ownership Reform; the 1991 Land Reform Act; and the 1991 
Law on Foreign Investment. Many of these laws address large-scale privatization of 
major industries, land reform, and FDI. By mid-June 1992, Estonia had introduced its 
new national currency, the Kroon, and in a three-day transition period, exchanged all 
bank accounts from the Ruble to the new currency (Pettai, 1996). In September 1993, the 
Estonian Privatization Agency (EPA) was established which administered the 
privatization process (Nations in Transit, 1998). Privatization of most enterprises was 
largely completed by mid 1996 (IMF, August 1999 CR/99174). During the first four 
years, most of the small and medium scale industries were sold. Most large-scale 
industries were sold to strategic investors with the objective of promoting competition 
and productivity. At independence, Estonia had around 450 large state owned enterprises 
and by mid 1996, 430 of them had been privatized. Estonia has had the most FDI per 
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capita of the five countries. It was the first to take on rapid privatization and had the 
earliest major increase in FDI becau:;e of this. 
Banking reform sta11ed early in Estonia and continued until mid 1998 when the 
banking industry was completely privatized. By late 1988, the first p1ivate bank was 
opened in Estonia. By the end of 1991, the number of banks in Estonia had grown to 24, 
20 of which were privately owned. The number of banks continued to increase and by 
June 1992, 41 commercial banks were in operation (IMF, August 1999 CR/99174). Yet 
in late 1992, insufficient banking legislation and the lack of professional skill and 
experience among managers lead to the insolvency of several major banks (Nations in 
Transit, 1998). A banking crisis ensued. The government reacted quickly by passing the 
Law on Credit Institutions and other strict policies to subdue the crisis. By 1994, the 
private banking sector had recovered. In 1998, the two largest state-owned banks were 
completely privatized by two Swedish banks (IMF, August 1999 CR/99/74). 
The privatization of the energy sector has been slow when compared to other 
large sector privatization efforts. Many contracts are in the works but privatization of 
much of the energy sector has been fraught with political battles. Nevertheless, major 
agreements were struck over two power plants in August 2000, which supplies over 90 
percent of the countries electricity (Nations in Transit, 2002). 
Agricultural reform has been fairly successful with 95 percent of the farms 
privatized by 1996 (Nations in Transit, 1998). Yet, "the limited progress in land 
privatization has hampered structural change in the agricultural sector, where almost half 
of all agricultural land is still cultivated by largely unrestructured farms. Only about 20 
percent of all agricultural land is privately owned (IMF, August 1999 CR/99/74, p.10)." 
29 
This has not affected FDI or the economy very much since less than 4 perc\:?r.t of the GDP 
comes from the agricultural sector. 
Latvia 
Latvian privatization is near complete. Major pieces of legislation that started the 
privatization process in Latvia include the 1990 Law on Agricultural Reform, the 1991 
Law of Land Reform in Towns and Cities, and the 1992 Law on the Order for 
Privatization of Objects of the State and Municipal Property (Nations in Transit, 1998). 
These laws addressed major privatization issues such as agricultural reform, land reform, 
and privatization of industries. In 1994, the Latvian Privatization Agency was 
established to handle the entire privatization process due to poor privatization in the first 
three years (IMF, August 2000, CR/99177). It was not given full control until late 1995, 
but it had an immediate impact. By early 2000, over 95 percent of state owned 
enterprises had been privatized and almost all small and medium enterprises were entirely 
in private hands (IMF, August 2000, CR/99177). Latvia is having problems in continuing 
the privatization in the telecommunications industry due to a long-term monopoly 
agreement that took place in the early 1990s. An agreement is in the works to reduce this 
time so that further privatization of the telecommunications industry will take place in 
early 2003 (Nations in Transit, 2002). Latvia had the second most FDI per capita, was 
the second to privatize and had the second to have a major increase in FDI. 
Banking reform took place in 1995 due to a major banking crisis. The banking 
sector was one of the first major industries to be completely privatized, which was 
completed by 1997. The crisis took place in 1995 when the largest bank in Latvia, Banka 
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Baltija, as well as many other smaller banks collapsed. This was due to risky iending 
practices, unsustainable deposit interest payments, fraud, insider-trading, and inadequate 
banking laws and regulations (Nations in Transit, 1998). The Bank of Latvia (BoL), the 
central bank, took immediate steps to solve the problem. It tightened restrictions and 
performed more than 100 on-site inspections. The Latvian banking system has met EU 
standards since 1998. Foreign banks are not restricted in any way pertaining to 
establishing branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices in Latvia (Repse, 2000). 
There has been less success in attempts to privatize many large state-owned 
energy enterprises. The energy industry was liberalized under the 1998 Law on the 
Energy sector (IMF, August 1999, CR/99177). It regulates the production, purchase, and 
distribution of various types of energy, the licensing and functioning of companies, and 
the supply of energy to consumers. It also integrates Latvia's energy industry into the 
international market. These steps were taken to attract FDI into the energy sector, but 
little has been done to privatize many of the large industries. 
Privatization with regards to agriculture has been successful. 58,000 farms have 
been established and most of the remaining collective farms have been converted into 
joint stock companies (Nations in Transit, 1998). Most of the privatization in this sector 
has been the result of early efforts and was completed by 1996. 
Lithuania 
Lithuanian privatization is presently in its second phase, which calls for 
privatization of major industries. The first phase started in 1991 when the Lithuanian 
parliament passed several major laws such as the Law on Initial Privatization of State 
Property, the Law on Privatization of the Property of Agricultural Enterprise, and the 
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Law on Privatization of Housing (Nations in Transit, 1 ()98). These laws created a legal 
framework to initiate privatization through a voucher program. These la\VS addressed the 
privatization of housing, agriculture, and small businesses. The second phase started in 
1995 but was delayed until 1997 due to legal disputes. This was mainly due to lack of 
transparency in the privatization process (Nations in Transit, 1998; IMF, September 
1999, CR/99/96). In 1997, a new law replace in the 1995 privatization law, major 
changes were mainly procedural. Major privatization efforts started taking place in the 
middle of 1998, when the sale of large enterprises in the energy, telecommunications, and 
transport sectors were undertaken. The sale of the shipping company LISCO in April 
2001 was the real start of privatization of strategic enterprises (IMF, August 1999, 
CR/99173; Freedom House, 2002). Lithuania was the third country to induce rapid 
privatization, third in FDI per capita, and third to have a major increase in FDI inflows. 
Banking reform has been necessary several times since independence. The Bank 
of Lithuania (BoL) was founded in 1990 to become the central bank of the new state. By 
1994, 28 banks operated in Lithuania, yet many of these acted as lending agencies for 
only a few enterprises (Enoch, Gulde, and Hardly, 2002). Later that year many banks 
were having problems complying with state capital requirements. The situation started to 
become serious and forced 14 smaller banks into bankruptcy proceedings. By late 1995, 
the situation developed into an all out crisis and only 12 banks survived (IMF, September 
1999, CR/99/96). An inspection of the Innovation Bank, the largest private bank in 
Lithuania, revealed major insolvency problems, which accelerated the situation (Enoch, 
Gulde, and Hardly, 2002). Further inspections revealed a similar situation in the entire 
Lithuanian banking system. Depositors reacted rapidly by shifting their deposit to state-
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controlled banks since their deposits \Vere fully guaranteed in these institutions. This 
exacerbated the banking crisis since this caused liquidity shortages in relatively solid 
private banks. Many of these problems were initially cause by bad ~ovemment policies. 
In September 1996, the government reformed the banking structure so that this 
problem could not happen again. Several private banks' licenses were revoked and 
liquidation procedures were initiated. This also caused a delay in privatization of the 
Agricultural Bank and the State Savings Bank by several years, which were finally 
privatized in 2001. These two banks dominated the market by controlling 45 percent of 
the total assets of the commercial banking system in Lithuania until they were privatized. 
The two largest private banks (Vilnius Bank and Hermis Bank) controlled about 40 
percent of the total assets; FDI played key roles in these banks (IMF, September 1999, 
CR/99/96). 
The energy sector is very important in Lithuania. Lithuania exports energy to 
neighboring states since its production capacity is more than three times the peak 
demand. After independence, major reforms took place to increase competition, reduce 
its overuse, and liberalize retail oil prices (IMF, September 1999, CR/99/96). By the end 
of 2001, 80 percent of the industry is owned by the state. Plans to privatize many of 
these enterprises are in the works but it appears that the state will play a major role in the 
industry for many years to come (Nations in Transit, 2002). 
The first phase of privatization reformed much of the agricultural sector. Most 
of the 1,000 state farms and collectives were dissolved and privatized as well as their 
assets. Lithuania followed a policy of restitution with the objective of returning all 
property that had been confiscated during the Soviet period to previous owners (IMF, 
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September 1999, CR/99/96). This slow process of land restitution has hampered the 
process of consolidating many of the small farms which would further the development 
of an agricultural land market. There is a limit on the amount of land that an individual 
may own and agricultural land cannot be purchased by foreign or domestic legal 
enterprises. 
Bulgaria 
Economic reform in Bulgaria has lagged behind most other European countries 
but it is now in the middle of major privatization. The process started in 1992 with the 
adoption of the Transformation and Privatization of State-Owned and Municipal 
Enterprise Law. This legislation introduced several methods of privatization such as 
open-tenders, auctions, management buyouts, and negotiations with potential buyers 
(Nations in Transit, 1998). Even though this legislation was introduced in 1992, the 
actual privatization process began slowly. Only small-scale privatization took place in 
the areas of trade, tourism and food processing (IMF, April 1999, CR/99/26). The real 
process of privatization started in late 1996. The government reoriented its priorities 
toward the privatization of large-scale industry and it also used vouchers to help privatize 
small industry. Still, this phase of privatization (late 1996- mid 1997) mainly transferred 
ownership of small enterprises or small stakes in large ones to private hands. It did not 
have a major effect on the privatization of large industry. The second wave of mass 
privatization started in early 1999, and by 2001, most small-scale enterprises and a 
significant portion of large-enterprises had been privatized (Nations in Transit, 2002). 
Major privatization deals that have been struck in 2001 are Hemus Air (the countries 
second largest airline), various industrial complexes, hotels, restaurants, and two 
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coalmines. However, there are numerous large-scale enterprises that still have not been 
privatized. Bulgaria started to p1ivatize major industry a little early than Romania and 
has seen a steady increase of FDI enter its country. It did not take a rapid privatization 
policy but after 1996, it continued to make attempts to privatize its major industries. 
Bank reform has finally been addressed in Bulgaria and after the banking crisis in 
1996 was dealt with, growth in FDI began to occur. In spite of some early structural 
changes, major problems existed in the banking system in 1996. Some of the problems 
were high degrees of concentration, in which five banks (four state owned, one private) 
controlled 60 percent of the total assets, most banks remained sectorally/regionally 
oriented, which left several highly exposed to vulnerable state enterprises, and state 
controlled banks remained dominant (Enoch, Gulde, and Hardly, 2002). Furthermore, 
many of the recent regulations enacted for the reason of creating a stable banking sector 
were not enforced. This was all combined with a rapid increase in nonperforming loans 
(mostly in state-owned banks), which exceeded 60 percent in some banks. Only 5 out the 
20 privately owned banks reported negative worth but the state-owned banks dominated 
the system. Yet, when the crisis hit, many of them became insolvent like most of the 
state-owned banks. Liquidity shortages and solvency problems created a major banking 
crisis in 1996. After several failures to fix the problems, the crisis was finally resolved 
by wide-range restructuring of the banking sector. The government bailing out the 
remaining state banks initially accomplished this. This helped restore confidence in 
banking system but soon after, the whole system was on the brink of collapse. 
Hyperinflation ensued. The turning point took place in 1997 when a new government set 
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up a currency board (Enoch, Gulde, and Hardly, 2002). This was the major factor that 
helped stabilize the banking situation in Bulgaria. 
Presently, larger banks based in the EU own most of the banks in Bulgaria. The 
banking sector is generating significant profit and its newfound stability has been a major 
reason why FDI has come into Bulgaria (Nations in Transit, 2002). 
Bulgaria's energy sector is a key to future economic growth, yet this area 
remained mostly untouched in any privatization effort until 1998. It has several major 
industries that have potential such as NEK (electricity), Bulgargas (gas), oil refining 
industries and coal mining industries (IMF, April 1999, SCR/99/26). Most of these 
industries had relative monopolies, were losing money and have not been subjected to 
market forces until 2001, all which discouraged FDI. Some investment has been injected 
into these industries but most major energy plants remain state-controlled. 
Agricultural reform has been more successful and privatization occurred more 
quickly. Yet until 1997, agricultural privatization and land restitution were still major 
issues. Bulgaria has a major comparative advantage in agriculture when compared to the 
rest of Europe so it is significant that this issue was not dealt with early on. The 
problems in this area have had a major negative effect on the growth of the Bulgarian 
economy. The first wave of privatization addressed most of these issues and by the end of 
1998, only a third of the grain storage capacity remained in state hands and the other 
agricultural sectors were completely privatized such as the wine and brewing enterprises, 
edible oil, and sugar sectors (IMF, April 1999, CR/99/26). Land restitution was 
accelerated and has made significant progress. 
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Romania 
Romanian privatization has made major progress over the last four years but it 
still lags behind most CEE countries. The 1991 Privatization Law established the State 
Ownership Fund (SOF), which granted 70 percent ownership of 6,400 enterprises to 
SOF. The law also established five P1ivate Ownership Funds (POF) in which the POFs 
received the other 30 percent ownership in these companies (Nations in Transit, 1998). 
The job of the POFs was to freely distribute shares in these enterprises to all adult 
Romania citizens. After restructuring the POFs and increasing the amount that they were 
able to distribute (which amounted to only 45 percent of the enterprises), most small 
enterprises that were scheduled to be privatized were completed by the end of 1996. A 
second wave of privatization has taken place. By the end of 2001, a total of 7,485 state 
companies had been privatized (Nations in Transit, 2002). Yet, major privatization still 
needs to take place in several major industries such as the Banca Comerciala Romana 
(BCR), ALRO Slatina, and ALPROM Slatina. Romania has lagged behind the other four 
countries in its privatization efforts and it is last in FDI per capita. Romania took an 
important step in 1997 with its aggressive privatization policies but failed to continue the 
trend. Major privatized did not start again until mid 2001. Its inconsistent policies in 
privatization have left its economy stagnant and in disarray. 
Only recently has the banking industry been privatized. In the end of 2001, the 
state-owned banks still controlled 44 percent of the total assets. The largest bank, Banca 
Comerciala Romana (BCR), is to have 51 percent of its shares privatized in 2002 
(Nations in Transit, 2002). In 1991, Romania established a two-tier banking system. 
Growth in both state-owned and private banks developed after the creation of this system 
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(L\1F, January, 2001 CR/01/16). In 1996, 33 hanks were operating in Romania, fi»'e were 
entirely state-owned, ten were mixed, ten were private, and eight were branches from 
foreign banks (Nations in Transit, 1998). De~pite the large number of banks, the state 
dominated over 70 percent of the financial activity. To make the situation even worse, 
two major private banks, Credit Bank and Dacia Felix Bank, failed. No FDI bailed out 
these banks and they were liquidated in the next year. The closing of Bancorex (a major 
state-owned bank) in 2000 helped increase Romania banking stability and tipped the 
balance of the percent of assets to the private banks (llv1F, January, 2001 CR/01/16). 
Only recently has there been major reform in the energy industry and little 
privatization has been accomplished in this industry (Nations in Transit, 1998; Nations in 
Transit, 2002). The EU has worked with Romania to set up a plan to help privatize the 
industry. By 2004, 25-30 percent of the thermal power production units should be 
privatized. Also, the state-owned PETROM has been listed on the stock exchange to help 
put some shares into private hands. 
Agricultural privatization has been fairly successful. By 1998, over 83 percent of 
the farmland was in private hands. The state does still control large agricultural 
intermediaries and national distribution and storage companies. It also dominates the 
livestock farming (Nations in Transit, 1998). 
Tables 4.2,4.3 and 4.4 summarizes all five countries FDI inflows and privatization 
processes. 
Conclusions 
After examining all of the data and comparing it with the speed of democratization of all 
five countries, several conclusions can be reached. First, 
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Table 4.2 

























































Foreign Direct Investments - per capita (net inflows recorded in the balance of payments divided by population) 
Country 1989-92 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1989-1999 
Estonia 41 111 151 142 79 93 410 159 1187 
Latvia 18 21 116 102 158 215 126 138 892 
Lithuania 14 8 8 19 41 87 249 129 558 
Bulgaria 5 5 13 12 17 63 66 100 281 
Romania 3 4 15 19 19 57 93 42 251 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, 2000, UNCTAD World Investment Report 1999. Note: FDI inflows in million US$ 
Source: Freedom House Nations in Transition, 2002. Note: Population year was 2002, used for all years. 
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Table 4.4 
Summery of Privatization Efforts 



















































Source: Freedom House Nations in Transition, 2002., Freedom House Nations in Transition, 1998., IMF, country reports cited in 
reference section. Note: Completed means that around 90 percent of the privatization has been completed, State-dominate means that 
some privatization has been done but the state owns the majority of the assets in the industry, State-Controlled means that very little or 
no privatization has been in this industry. 
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privatization and major increases in FDI are related. This means that privatization may 
have a positive effect on the economy by inducing increased levels of outside investment 
into the country. Second, the levels of GDP and DEM scores seem to be related. The 
Baltic States have very similar DEM scores as well as GDP levels. This is also true in 
both of the Balkan countries studied. Therefore, if privatization has a positive effect on 
GDP levels and GDP levels and democracy are related than transition countries economic 
policies can have an effect on the speed of democratic consolidation. 
One point that can be argued is that privatization does have both a positive and 
negative impact upon democratization. Estonia is a perfect example of how rapid 
privatization can help democratization. Many scholars suggest that this is how it should 
be done. Yet, the other two Baltic States did not follow this exact plan of rapid 
privatization and are still doing well. It may be that privatization has a negative short-
range impact (for about a year) but a positive medium and long-range impact. The only 
case that does not illustrate this is Estonia and that may well be due to their rapid 
privatization process, which was almost completed by the end of 1996. Therefore we can 
conclude that unless rapid privatization is initiated very early in the transition process, it 
will have a negative short-term effect but positive medium and long-range effects. 
The three cases that best demonstrate my point about the negative short-range 
effects are the three slowest privatizing countries, which were Lithuania, Bulgaria, and 
Romania. All three experienced a slow down or a set back in DEM scores within a year 
of major privatization efforts. Yet, after this set back, DEM scores then began to 
decrease again. Yet, Romania and Bulgaria have seen their rapid improvements in DEM 
scores come to stand still. I attribute this to slow increased FDI and GDP growth, which 
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wns what helped the Baltic States consolidate their democracies. The policies of gradual 
privatization or "stan and stop" privatization have hindered growth in both Romania and 
Bulgaria. 
Rapid privatization in the Baltic States created an important environment for 
economic growth, which is also illustrated by GDP growth patterns in Tablel. In 1993, 
the Baltic States had lower levels of GDP per capita than both Romania and Bulgaria but 
after 1996 all three of the Baltic States' GDPs had far surpassed both Balkan States' 
GDPs. This economic growth was fed by privatization, which demonstrates how 
privatization may help create a stronger economy in these countries. Therefore, my 
conclusions are that the Baltic States policies to privatize their economies in rapid fashion 





Explanatory Variable 2 
Transitional Factors 
The way in which the transition to democracy took place can influence the speed 
of consolidated. The factors that this thesis examines are the modes of transition, whether 
violence played a role in the transition process, and the initial post-communist political 
contest winner. Huntington (1991) discusses three distinct types of transitions: 
transitions from above (transformation/transaction/reform); from below 
(replacement/breakdown/rupture); and transition where both incumbent and opposition 
play major roles in transforming the system (transplacement/extrication). Several authors 
(Huntington, 1991; Munck and Leff, 1997; Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Welsh, 1994) 
maintain that the transplacement method seems to be the most beneficial for democratic 
consolidation. I then suspect that countries using the transplacement will show signs of 
greater consolidation. Dahl (1998) notes that violent transition appear to have a negative 
affect on the future of the regime. From this, I assume that violent transitions will hurt 
consolidation. Finally, several authors (Kurtz and Barnes, 2002; Fish, 1998b; Hanson, 
1998; Welsh, 1994; Ishiyama, 1997) have noted the importance of the initial post-
communist political contest. I expect that if the former communists take power, than 
consolidation will also be slowed. 
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Estonia 
All three Baltic States not only had to transform their government from an 
authoritarian to a democratic one but they also had to attain independence from the So\'iet 
Union. With glasnost and perestroika, many liberalizing movements took place and 
eventually the Estonian Popular Front (PFE) was organized in April 1989 (Pettai, 1996). 
This led to a more than two-year struggle with the Soviet Union for independence. On 
August 19, 1991, while an attempted coup was taking place in Moscow, Estonia declared 
independence (Pettai, 1996). The key to understanding Estonia's transition from 
communist to democratic is that the leader of the PRE, Edgar Savisaar, was a reformist 
ex-communist (Raun, 1997). Savisaar was left-wing moderate and leader of the Supreme 
Council, the official legislature of Estonia, from April 1990- January 1992. He and the 
Supreme Council worked with the Congress of Estonia, the opposition legislature, to 
create the Estonian Constitution. Each group sent representatives to the Constitutional 
Assembly, which began deliberations in September 2001. On June 28, 1992, the new 
Estonian Constitution was approved by referendum with an overwhelming 91.2 percent 
voting yes (Raun, 1997). The first elections brought a coalition of moderate and right 
wing reformers to power. 
This method of transition would be considered transplacement. Both communist 
and opposition forces worked together to achieve independence and create the new 
Estonian Constitution. Bargaining or joint action took place between both the former 
communists and the opposition in most transitional decisions. This process of bargaining 
has continued in Estonia and has helped consolidate the democratic regime. It is also 
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important to note that the opposition forces won the initial post-communist political 
contest. Violence was absent in the transition process. 
Latvia 
The independent movement was also strong in Latvia. The Popular Front of 
Latvia (LTF) formed and championed the movement for an independent Latvia. In 
December 1989, the Latvian Supreme Soviet decided to end the communist party's 
monopoly on political power (Dreifelds, 1996). The new Supreme Council, formerly the 
Latvian Supreme Soviet, was elected in March 1990 in which two-thirds belonged to the 
LFT. This led the way to a declaration of intent for an independent Republic of Latvia in 
May 1990. Little progress was being made in attempts to bargain with the Soviet Union 
for Latvian independence so Latvia did as Estonia did and declared independence from 
the Soviet Union on August 21, 1991(Dreifelds,1996). The coup attempt in Moscow 
was the key to success. Thus, Latvia became independent. 
The transition process was filled with bargaining between the Supreme Council 
and an opposition group called the Latvian's Citizens' Committee. The Supreme Council 
and the opposition fought over constitutional rules and laws. They argued against several 
issues in the constitution that the Supreme Council created. They claimed that even 
though the Supreme Council was freely elected, the communist led Supreme Soviet 
established the rules of the game (Dreifelds, 1996). They claimed that the parliamentary 
body was illegitimate and therefore the Constitution was as well. This led to the creation 
of a separate parliamentary faction called Satversme. Bargaining between the two groups 
took place and the end results was the re-instatement of the 1922 Latvian Constitution 
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(Plakans, 1997). The first Latvian Sacima (Jx.trliamentary) rlections took place on June 
5-6, 1993. The result was the election of a coalition government composed of two 
pai1ies. It was composed of a centrist party and a right wing party. Latvia's Way 
dominated the coalition and was the centrist party and the Latvian Agrarian Union was 
the right wing party in the coalition (Plakans, 1997). 
The Latvian method of transition also would appear to be transplacement. Major 
bargaining took place between the opposition and the former communists. The key to 
this bargaining is that the opposition did not allow the former communists to set up the 
rules of the game. The opposition did not accept the Supreme Councils constitution. It, 
instead, worked with the Supreme Council so that both parties could work out their 
constitutional differences. It is also important to note that some former communists came 
to power vis-a-vis, the Latvia's Way Party, but most political elites in power were of the 
opposition party. No violence was involved in the transition process. 
Lithuania 
Like the other two Baltic States, independence was the first goal and the 
democratic transition was second. The Lithuanian Reconstruction Movement, which 
later became known as Sajudis, was a council composed equally of communist party 
members and non-members. In October 1988, Vytautus Landsbergis, a non-communist, 
was elected chairman of Sajudis (Vardys and Slaven, 1996). In December 1989, the 
Lithuanian Communist Party seceded from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) and gave up its monopoly on power. In March 1990, the communist won only 
23 out of 141 seats in the Supreme Soviet and Landsbergis became the new chairman 
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(Vardys and Slaven, 1996). On the same day, the newly elected government pwclaimed 
independence from the Soviet Union on the grounds that the incorporation of Lithua:1ia 
into the Soviet Union \Vas not legal. Moscow did not accept the legality of Lithuanian 
independence and attempted to remove Landsbergis from power in a coup (Krickus, 
1997). The coup failed and in the end Lithuania became an independent nation in August 
1991 during the failed coup attempt in Moscow. 
After two years of conflict and frustration, the Lithuanian Constitution was 
approved in a referendum on October 25, 1992 (Krickus, 1997). The new system of 
government became operational in February 2003 with the election of the former 
communist party, now named the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDLP). 
Like in the previous two cases, Lithuania's method of transition would appear to 
be transplacement as well. The former communists and many members from Sajudis, 
especially Landsbergis, worked together to achieve independence and create the 
Lithuanian Constitution. It is important to note that former communists won the initial 
post communist elections. Yet, they did not come into power until February 1993, which 
did not give them an opportunity to create the institutional system. The constitution was 
already ratified before they took power. No violence was involved in the transition to 
democracy. 
Bulgaria 
Unlike the Baltic States' transitions, Bulgaria's transition toward democracy took 
place from above. The opposition to the ruling communists in Bulgaria was weak and 
unorganized. Yet, when the initial collapse of the Soviet Union took place 1989, younger 
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communist leaders saw their opportunity to take power (Munck and Leff, 1997). Tudor 
Zhivkov was the leader of communist party in Bulgaria but he lost support from inside 
Bulgaria and now Moscow (Crampton, 1997). A Turkish revolt combined with a 
staggering 344,000 Turks emigrating from Bulgaria inflicted major darrage upon the 
Bulgarian economy. This weakened Zhivkov's already questionable legitimacy. This 
new policy of Soviet nonintervention shifted the internal balance of power in the 
communist party in Bulgaria. Petur Mladenov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was the 
head of the opposition group that was challenging Zhivkov's power. These younger 
leaders consulted with Gorbachev in November 1989 before displacing the top leadership 
of the communist party in the infamous palace coup. Mladenov was now in charge 
(Crampton, 1997). 
The impact of the revolution from above on the consolidation efforts is quite 
obvious today. The leaders of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) met with leaders of 
the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), a coalition of fourteen non-communist political 
groups, and representatives of the Turkish minority (Crampton, 1997). They all agreed to 
end the communist regime and set up a democratic government. The BCP discussed with 
UDF how the changes would take place but Mladenov and BCP were still in charge of 
the country. The leaders set up a majoritarian electoral system in the initial post-
communist political competition in June 1990 (Munck and Leff, 1997). The combination 
of fast elections and a majoritarian electoral system benefited the better-organized party. 
This led to the election of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which was the formerly the BCP 
(Goldman, 1999). With this election, the former communists created the Bulgarian 
Constitution of 1991 and set up the rules for competition in the new regime. This 
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Constitution was largely democratic but contained language potentially restrictive of 
freedom of speech and minority organization (Munck and Leff, 1997). These rules set 
by the former communist party have lead to several undemocratic norms in the Bulgarian 
government. Post-transitional politics in Bulgaria have been marked by violations of 
democratic procedures. Some of these violations include canceled or invalidated local 
elections, reports of electoral manipulation and fraud, conflict with the media, and jailing 
of key journalists (Munck and Leff, 1997). 
The implications from this demonstrate how a mode of transition from above, or 
transformation, can impair democratic consolidation and growth. This revolution from 
above has spawned a pattern of elite interaction that is largely unacceptable to democracy 
values. This has ultimately slowed the consolidation effort in Bulgaria. It also 
demonstrates that how detrimental a former communist victory in the initial post-
communist political contest winner can be for democratic consolidation. Violence was 
not involved in the transformation of the system. 
Romania 
Like Bulgaria, the initial collapse of the Soviet Union, which took place in 
November 1989, had an impact on the legitimacy of the Romanian communist regime. 
Yet, circumstances were different in Romania. Ceausescu, the general secretary of the 
Communist Party in Romania, refused to step down which lead to the most violent 
transition in Eastern Europe (Roper, 2000; Goldman, 1999). In November 1989, 
Ceausescu was re-elected general secretary and at the same time denounced events taking 
place in other Eastern European countries. This, plus the fact that Ceausescu was the 
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center of public life, centered all the fmstration and d1scontenl toward him. This situation 
eventually led to the December 17th revolution. which Jed to the death of Ceausescu and 
his family on Christmas day (Roper, '.2000). 
There has been a strong debate about whether this was a true revolution or just a 
coup. Yet, several authors maintain that some form of popular uprising was necessary to 
remove Ceausescu from power (Verdcry and Klingman, 1992). Others argue that a coup 
succeeded in hijacking the revolution, which eventually placed the former communists 
back in power (Pilon, 1992). The importance of this violent revolution is stressed by its 
impact on the democratic transition process. For many Romanians, the events of 
December 1989 was a coup, not a revolution, and the violence was not deemed 
necessary. The lesson from this is that violence, necessary or not, can be an essential tool 
in which to resolve conflict (Roper, 2000). One demonstration of this is the unnecessary 
and savage use of force against demonstrators in 1991 (Goldman, 1999). This belief that 
violence can and should be used to help solve problems has hinder democratic growth in 
Romania and may continue to do so unless leaders react to civil unrest in a more 
appropriate manor. 
The National Salvation Front (FSN), which was initially used by Ceausescu to 
help put down the revolutionary movements, was the group that eventual displaced him 
from power. After his death, the FSN, composed mostly of former communists, used the 
revolution to garner popular support in the first post-communist election in May 1990 
(Roper, 2000). They organized and won the initial elections in 1990 and the leadership of 
this party maintained control of the Romanian government until 1996. The FSN' s 
success was attributed to the lack of opposition, manipulation of the mass media, and its 
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prominent role in the December Revolution (Roper, 2000). They also made it very 
difficult for opposite parties to organize. Opposition parties could not get office 
eqmpment or space (Goldman, 1999). This was not a problem for the former communist 
FSN party. Also, several opposition politicians complained of harassment by security 
forces. Since these f01mer communist leaders maintained power for six years, they were 
instrumental in establishing the rules and norms of the political system and they were the 
key authors of the 1991 Romanian Constitution. 
The major implication from this transition is that violence does appear to have a 
negative effect on democratic consolidation efforts. A closer look at the situation does 
give credence to the argument that this revolution played out more like a coup or 
transition from above. The FSN used the riots by the people to help them overthrow 
Ceausescu. They were opportunists. These former communists used the potential 
rupture of system or transition from below to their advantage and transformed the system 
in a manner which benefited themselves. After this, they had more power than any other 
contending party. They were more organized, held early elections, and used their role as 
revolutionaries in the December revolution as a way to win the initial elections. This lead 
to a very similar situation that took place in Bulgaria and had similar results. The 
communists set up the system and were very slow to reform. Violence, corruption and 
other non-democratic means are seen as normal ways to achieve political ends. This 
demonstrates how important transitional factors can affect future consolidation efforts. 
Conclusions 
This section examined three major factors of the transition process. First, when 
examining the mode of transition, it gives credence to argument that transplacement helps 
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consolidation efforts. All three Baltic States transferred from a communist system to a 
democratic one by means of transpla.cement. These are also more successfully 
consolidated democracies. Bulgaria and Romania, which have been less successful at 
consolidating their democracies, transformed through different methods. It is clear that 
Bulgaria transformed from above and it appears that this method has affected their 
consolidation efforts. Romania is a different case. Scholars disagree which method of 
transformation Romania used. It actually appears to be a combination of transformation 
from below, the riots, and above, communist party dominance after the revolts. Yet, the 
result is the same as Bulgaria's, which is that Communists consolidated power to create 
the new regime. 
Table 5.1 - Summary of Factors of Transition 
Country Mode of Violence Victor in 
Transition Initial Election 
Estonia Transplacement No Right Wing Party 
Latvia Trans placement No Centrist Party 
Lithuania Transplacement No Former Communist Party 
Bulgaria Transformation No Former Communist Party 
Romania Rupture and Yes Former Communist Party 
Transformation 
Even though no other state in this study went through a violent transition, the case 
of Romania does demonstrate how detrimental the use of violence can be to a fledgling 
democracy. It is obvious that violence has had a negative effect on the consolidation 
52 
efforts of Romania. The use of violence to solve political problems such as protests has 
demonstrated this very fact. 
The initial post-communist political contest winner has also seemed to be a 
significant factor. The key issue is that if the former communists gain initial power, they 
may set up constitutional situations that are less than fully democratic. This then would 
affect consolidation efforts. This seemed to be true in all but one case. Lithuania saw the 
former communists return to power after the initial election. Yet it did not effect the 
construction of the constitution since the initial elections took place after the constitution 
was ratified. 
Finally, there does seem to be some logical relationship between the mode of 
transition and the initial post-communist political contest winner. Yet this relationship 
may not be as strong as logic deems. The transition from above in both cases of Romania 
and Bulgaria aided the former communists in the initial election. Yet in the Baltic 
scenario in which all three transitions were transplacements, three different results 
occurred. In Estonia, a coalition of three right wing opposition parties gained power. In 
Latvia, a centrist party won the most seats. In Lithuania, a left wing party dominated the 
initial elections. This is a surprising result. It is possible that the Baltic States are 
outliers in this case but the results are significant enough to warrant further research. 
Also, it is important to note that the initial post-communist political contest winner 





Explanatory Variable 3 
Electoral Rules 
The type of electoral system employed by a country has major ramifications upon 
how politics will work in that system. The kind of system becomes even more important 
when trying to establish a democratic regime. Ishiyama (1997) claims that the kind of 
electoral system chosen can promote or detract from the viability and the legitimacy of a 
new regime. Certain rules can prevent extreme fragmentation of the party system, hence 
allowing the emergence of a stable government. Other rules can affect how minorities 
participate in the new regime, which can have either positive or negative effects on the 
legitimacy of the regime. This is important in this study since all five countries have 
significant populations of ethnic minorities. All of these issues can affect the 
consolidation process. 
With this in mind, it is important to understand how each country's electoral rules 
have influenced the democratic consolidation process. Much of the literature favors PR 
(Proportional Representation) systems for consolidating new ethnically divided 
democratic regimes (Lijphart, 1974; Lijphart, 1977; Nordlinger, 1972; McRae, 1974; 
Daalder, 1971; Lorwin, 1971). Therefore, I will examine each country's electoral rules. 
Since Barry (1975) and Horowitz (1985) and Brass (1991) all mention that PR systems 
can create a situation in which extremist parties can develop and become an 
antidemocratic force, I also expect that restrictions on communist, fascist, will have a 
positive effect on consolidating these new regimes. Yet, since the argument for a PR 
system is to allow minorities a voice in the political system, I would expect that 
54 
outlawing ethnic ;1ased parties would have a negative effect on consolidation. Jf the 
electoral system does not allow them to participate in government, then they have no 
vested interest in retaining the government. They would then be more inclined to see to 
the destruction of this regime then support it. Therefore, outlawing ethnic based parties 
should have a negative impact on consolidation. Finally, thresholds should help stabilize 
the party system. I expect them to have a positive impact on consolidation. 
Citizenship laws are an important issue for ethnic integration into the political 
system. These laws can be very important when establishing legitimacy with minorities. 
Yet, this issue should not have a profound effect on Romania or Bulgaria. Both were 
satellite countries of the Soviet Union as opposed to the Baltic States who did not have 
national borders or citizens. Therefore, unless Romania or Bulgaria made changes to 
their citizenship Jaws, this should only affect the Baltic States since these laws are 
important when setting up a country as opposed to only changing type of government. 
Estonia 
The leader of the PRE, Edgar Savisaar, a reformist ex-communist, won election to 
the Supreme Council in March 1990 (Raun, 1997). He and the Supreme Council worked 
with the Congress of Estonia, the opposition legislature, to create the Estonian 
Constitution. Initial elections before Estonian independence had a different form of 
electoral system then they presently do. The initial electoral system resulted from an 
uneasy compromise between the former communists and the opposition. In the end, the 
result for the initial election was an STV, which effectively was a non-list PR system 
(Ishiyama, 1997). Yet after independence and with the approval of the new Estonian 
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Constitution, a new electoral system was created. The new system is very similar to the 
German additional member system. 
It is a complicated system that is based on the PR list system but allows for 
individual candidates to run for election. A vote for a candidate counts for a vote for that 
individual and for his/her party. It allows Estonians to vote for candidates rather than just 
the party label or program. The individual candidate will only be elected when their 
votes surpassed the simple quota (this varies from election to election). If they do not 
surpass the quota, then they have a chance to gain a seat through the pure PR method if 
seats remain (lshiyama, 1999). The system also has two kinds of thresholds to prevent 
party system fragmentation. A party can gain seats through the PR method if the party 
captures at least five percent of the national vote or if it has at least three candidates 
elected by simple quota (lshiyama, 1999). 
The implications from this system are that it promotes individual competition and 
circumvents Brass's argument against PR systems in ethnically divided societies. Brass 
(1991) suggests that first-past the post systems are better in ethnically divided societies 
because they promote individual conflict rather than group conflict. He claims that this 
diffuses ethnic conflict by taking the focus off of group divisions and reverting it to the 
individual. This should help ethnic consolidation in Estonia. 
This system also has thresholds, which should help contain party fragmentation 
and create a stable party system. No parties are outlawed, yet they must meet certain size 
requirements. This is to limit the number of parties in system (Nations in Transit, 1998). 
The system does not outlaw ethnic based parties but it does make them inherently weaker 
since catch all parties would have greater success in the system. This system should have 
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a positive effect on ethnic integration into the system since it does allow ethnic minorities 
to participate politically, yet it discourages them from forming parties strictly around 
ethnicity. Therefore, societal cleavages should not form around ethnic lines. 
Estonia has been one of the more successful countries when it comes to 
privatization and overall democratization, but it has had its share of problems with ethnic 
strife. This has mainly been due to the citizenship law and its large ethnic Russian 
population. Ethnic Estonians comprise about sixty-one percent of the population while 
ethnic Russians represent about a little above thirty percent (Pettai, 1996). In November 
1991, Estonia reinstated its 1938 citizenship law. This meant that any individuals who 
were citizens before June 1940 or any decedents of former Estonian citizens were granted 
full citizenship (Raun, 1996). The non-citizens had to go through a three-year 
naturalization process (starting March 1990), which required for non-citizens to 
demonstrate a modest level of competence in the Estonian language. These restrictions 
slowed the consolidation of the new regime by excluding a large minority of residents in 
Estonia. The language requirement is not overly difficult but it is still a barrier for many 
nonccitizens. 
Latvia 
In December 1989, the Latvian Supreme Soviet decided to end the communist 
party's monopoly on political power (Dreifelds, 1996). The new Supreme Council, 
formerly the Latvian Supreme Soviet, was elected in March 1990 in which two-thirds 
belonged to the LFT. The initial electoral system used in March 1990 was a Soviet style 
winner-take-all system. But a new system was already being discussed for an 
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independent Latvia. Bargaining between the opposition and the Supreme Council took 
place, which resulted in I.he re-instatement of the 1922 Latvian Constitution with only 
minor changes to the 1922 electoral system (Plakans, 1997). The present electoral system 
resembles a traditional PR system. It uses party lists and four percent thresholds 
(Dreifelds, 1996a). One resulting change was the lowering of eligible voting age from 
twenty-one to eighteen. There had also been some restrictions placed on eligibility for 
election. This includes anyone who was active in the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) or any other pro-Soviet organization after January 13, 1991. This affected 
13 candidates in the 1995 elections (Ishiyama, 1999). Communist, fascist, and other 
parties that are anti-constitutional were outlawed. 
Ethnic discontent has also proven to be a problem in Latvia. The primary reason 
for this discontent has been attributed to the restrictive citizenship law. This coupled 
with a very divided ethnic population created problems for the consolidation of the 
regime and the Latvian government. Ethnic Latvians comprise about fifty-two percent of 
the population while ethnic Russians represent a little less then thirty percent (Cichock, 
2002). Other groups such Belorussians, Ukrainians, Poles, and Lithuanians each 
represented between one and four percent of the population. On October 15, 1991 the 
controversial citizenship law was adopted. Any people who could prove residence or had 
at least one parent with Latvian citizenship before Soviet occupation in 1940 were 
granted automatic citizenship. The initial guidelines for naturalization were the 
knowledge of spoken Latvian, residence in Latvia for sixteen years and renouncement of 
citizenship in any other country (Dreifelds, 1996a). 
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The requirement for the spoken language loomed large since most Russians had 
never bothered to ieam the language. It was rarely spoken before Latvian independeJ1l.'C 
in most large cities since minorities dominated urban Latvia. This was never signed into 
la\V because of the heavy opposition to the harsh language requirements. A watered 
down version was signed into law in 1994 (adopted constitutional in 1998) but the 
language requirement still created problems for many ethnic Russians (Cichock, 2002). 
These harsh citizenship laws have created a rift between ethnic Russians and Latvians. 
Only recently have many of the ethnic Russians attained the skill at speaking Latvian to 
attain citizenship. A large percentage of ethnic Russian have not become Latvian 
citizens. This causes problems for democratic consolidation. 
Lithuania 
In March 1990, the communists won 23 out 141 seats in the Supreme Soviet. Its 
initial electoral system, like Latvia, was a Soviet style winner-take-all system. After two 
years of conflict and frustration, the Lithuanian Constitution was approved in a 
referendum on October 25, 1992 and the new system of government became operational 
in February 2003 (Vardys and Slaven, 1996). 
The new electoral system is similar to the French semi-presidential system. The 
executive consists of both a president and prime minister with a cabinet known as the 
Council of Ministers. Both the president, who is elected popularly, and the prime 
minister, who is appointed by the president and approved by the Seimas (parliament), 
have significant political power. Seventy seats are elected from party lists on the basis of 
PR and seventy-one are elected through winner-take-all single member district elections. 
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There is a four percent threshold that a party must surpass to gain seats through PR 
(Vardys and Slaven, 1996). An exception is made for ethnic minority groups who do not 
have to surpass the 4 percent threshold. This system gives an advantage for minority 
participation and should promote ethnic consolidation. 
Out of the three Baltic States, Lithuania has had the least amount of trouble with 
ethnic conflict. This is most likely due to its relaxed citizenship laws and significantly 
smaller percent of minorities. In 1989, the Lithuanian government passed the present day 
citizenship law. The biggest part of the law that helped with ethnic consolidation was 
that it contained the "zero option." This allowed for persons who had lived and worked 
in Lithuania to become citizens within two years (Krickus, 1997). Ethnic Lithuanians 
comprise about eighty percent of the population. Ethnic Russians represent a little over 
eight percent and the Poles account for seven percent of the population. These liberal 
citizenship laws and the conviction that certain parties do represent their political 
interests have been the key factors in Lithuania's successful integration of its minorities 
(Krickus, 1997). No political parties are outlawed. 
Bulgaria 
After the palace coup, the BCP had full control over the future of Bulgaria. The 
leaders of the BCP met with leaders of the UDF and representatives of the Turkish 
minority. The leaders set up a majoritarian electoral system in the initial post-communist 
political competition in June 1990. The combination of fast elections and a majoritarian 
electoral system benefited a better-organized party. The BSP won the initial post 
communist elections and wrote the new Bulgarian Constitution. The BSP set up a PR 
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system with a four percent threshold. The position of president \Vas ceremonial and had 
no real power. 
In regard to ethnic minorities, there is a law that claims that citizens do not have a 
right to form parties based on ethnic, religious, or racial principals. The population of 
Bulgaria is comprised mostly of ethnic Bulgarians but there are significant minority 
groups. Ethnic Bulgarians comprise eighty-six percent of the population while the 
Turkish population consists of about nine percent, the Roma consist of about four 
percent, and the Ethnic Macedonian populations is less than one percent. Even though 
this law exists, the original Bulgarian Turk party has been allowed to remain while the 
constitutional court has disbanded both Roma and Macedonian ethnic parties (Nations in 
Transit, 2001). 
Romania 
After Ceausescu's death, the FSN, composed mostly of former communists 
assumed provisional power. They called for elections to take place in May 1990 for the 
purpose of creating a new Romania government. This new governments primary 
responsibility was to create the new Romanian Constitution. The system established a 
bicameral parliamentary system with prime minister and president. The electoral system 
was a closed party listed PR system with no thresholds (Roper, 2000). The government 
also established a powerful president that was elected by the people. The winner had to 
receive an absolute majority or a run-off election would take place between the top two 
candidates. An overwhelming seventy-three parties participated in the election. The 
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FSN dominated the election by winning sixty-eight percent of the seats and Iliescu, the 
provisional president, dominated the presidential election by receiving over eighty-fi\'e 
percent of the vote (Roper, 2000). 
\Vith the FSN's overwhelming victory, they dominated the drafting committee for 
the creation of the Romania constitution. The new constitution established a semi-
presidential regime, which put a vast amount of power in the hands of the president. The 
parliament was elected through a closed party list PR system with a three percent 
threshold (Roper, 2000). The installment of the threshold has had a positive effect on 
stabilizing the party system. After the 1992 elections, this reduced the number of parties 
in the parliament from eighteen to nine. 
When compared to the other four countries, ethnic minorities exert significantly 
less influence in the political sphere. Ethnic Romanians comprise eighty-eight percent of 
the population, while ethnic Hungarians consist of about nine percent and Ethnic 
Germans and Roma consists of about one percent each. Communist, fascist, totalitarian, 
and extremist parties are outlawed but ethnic parties are not (Nations in Transit, 1998). 
Conclusion 
All five countries have important minority groups and all five have chosen some 
variation of a PR system and all five countries seem to be consolidating their ethnic 
minorities. Yet, different rules in these various systems have effected ethnic 
consolidation. All PR systems appear to have a positive affect on consolidation but 
mixed systems seem to be the best choice. Mixed system, those in which seats are elected 
through PR and winner-take-all, appear to have a strong positive impact on ethnic 
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Summary of Electoral Factors 
Country Type of System Levels of Parties Restrictive 
And Threshold levels Ethnic Diversity Outlawed Citizenship Laws 
Estonia Complex PR High none yes 
5 percent threshold 
Latvia Traditional PR High anti constitutional yes 
4 percent threshold or extremist 
Lithuania Mixed Medium none no 
4 percent threshold 
Bulgaria Traditional PR Low ethnic/religious docs not 
4 percent threshold apply 
Romania Closed party List PR Low anti constitutional does not 
3 percent threshold or extremist apply 
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consolidation. These allow minorities to participate but disrnurage strong ethnic baseJ. 
pa11ies from appearing. Parties grov' around issues not ethnic differences. 
Latvia, and to a lesser extent, Estonia, have had some problems establishing 
legitimacy with their ethnic minorities. It is not surprising since these two countries both 
have larger ethnic minority groups when compared to the other three. This could be part 
of the problem but the restrictive citizenship law appears to be real culprit. Latvia had a 
very strict language requirement for its naturalization process, which created major 
problems with ethnic Russians. This law certainly slowed the democratic consolidation 
process since many of the ethnic Russians could not vote since they were not citizens. It 
also did not help create much legitimacy for the new regime among the ethnic Russians. 
Estonia had less of a problem with this since their language requirement was less 
restrictive. This too has slowed the consolidation effort in Estonia but the effect has been 
less damaging to the legitimacy of the Estonian government than the Latvian 
government. The other factor that may have helped the Estonian government retain some 
of its legitimacy was its more complex electoral system. The Estonian electoral system 
promotes individual competition instead of group competition. Group competition can 
form around ethnic lines but the Estonian system not only encourages individual 
competition but creates incentives for parties to mass based. 
Unsurprisingly, the outlawing of extremist parties had a positive impact on 
democratic consolidation, yet the outlawing of ethnic based parties has hurt democratic 
consolidation. The outlawing of ethnic parties in Bulgaria has had a negative impact since 
the government is viewed as not treating all ethnic groups equally. While Bulgaria has 
experienced problems with its ethnic minorities, Romania has some success in integrating 
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its non-ethnic Romanians. The Romanian system has allowed the creation of several 
ethnic/nationalist-based parties, which has no rules against their creation. The low three 
percent thresholds as opposed to higher four or five percent thresholds employed in the 
other four countries have also facilitated this growth in ethnic parties. These parties have 
little influence in the government but do create opportunity for ethnic minorities to have 
representation in government. This has created legitimacy for government among ethnic 
minorities. 
The creation of thresholds has been a stabilizing factor in all five countries. The 
low threshold may help representation for ethnic based parties but it has had a negative 
effect on the creation of a stable party system. Several more parties exist in Romania 
than in any other of the countries study. Estonia's electoral system has created the most 
stable party system. These factors have had an impact on democratic consolidation 
process for both creating a stable party system and ethnic integration. Yet, it does not 
seem that these factors have had a comparative impact since all five countries have 
employed some form of a PR system. It seems that citizenship laws have had the largest 
impact in the comparative perspective. Lithuania's relaxed citizenship law helped with 




Discussion of Results 
After investigating possible variables, it appears that several factors have 
influenced democratic consolidation. It appears that all three variables had a significant 
impact in consolidation efforts. Chapter four demonstrates how rapid privatization, 
which was quickly transformed into economic growth, appears to have helped the Baltic 
States generate legitimacy for the new regime. Coincidently, the Balkan States have seen 
little economic growth and less democratic consolidation. 
It was demonstrated in chapter five how factors at the time of transition such as 
mode of transition, violence, and winner of the initial post-communist political contest 
may play important roles in consolidation. All three Baltic States' mode of transition was 
through transplacement, while the Balkan States' method was transformation. A violent 
transition appears to have had a negative influence on Romanian politics. Finally, the 
winner of the initial post-communist political contest appears also to have played a 
fundamental role on consolidation. Both in Romania and Bulgaria former communists 
were elected to power in the initial post-communist political contest while two of the 
three Baltic States elected a coalition of opposition groups. Lithuania appears to be an 
outlier in the case since many former communists gained power during the first post 
communist election, but it is important to note the opposition to the former communists 
played an instrumental role in creating the Lithuanian Constitution. 
With regards to the electoral process, the PR system seems to have aided all five 
countries in consolidation. Thresholds appear to have generated some stability in the 
party system. The real problems lie with ethnic conflict generated by the citizenship law 
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and the outlawing of ethnic based parties. The restrictive citizenship laws appear to have 
slo'.ved Latvian and Estonian consolidation of the ethnic Russian minority. Contrary to 
these two, Lithuania's relaxed citizenship law has generated ethnic stability in its country. 
Bulgaria's outlawing of ethnic based parties has caused problems for the regime. Protests 
over the disbandment of several ethnic based parties have occurred. 
All of these factors seem to have some relevance when examining the 
consolidation process. Also, there seems to be some interplay between factors. Yet some 
factors appear to be more influential in a specific case. Therefore, I will examine this 
interplay between factors by examining all three factors in each country. I will examine 
factors unique to each country but two themes that will be examined are how the mode of 
transition influenced the creation of the constitution and how the winner of the initial 
post-communist political contest influenced the speed of privatization. 
Estonia 
Estonia's overall democratic consolidation appears to be very successful, only 
trumped by its even stronger economic success. There have been some problems with 
consolidating the ethnic Russian minority but this has presented only minor problems for 
the new regime. In fact, Kolsto (2002) reveals that almost two-thirds of the ethnic 
Russian population feel that they have a better opportunity for economic development in 
Estonia than in Russia. It can be argued that this economic growth has helped 
consolidate the ethnic Russian minority. 
The winner of the initial post-communist political contest appears to have 
influenced the speed of privatization. In September 1992, the first elections brought a 
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coalition of three right wing parties to power. This strong coalition faced many problems 
due to inexperience but nevertheless was united on the rapid privatization policy. The 
bold economic reforms that were set in place under the first independent government 
have endured despite several governmental changes (Raun, 1997). It can be argued that 
these aggressive free market policies were the result of the strong right wing coalition. 
Out of the five countries studied, Estonia privatized the fastest. Therefore, it is important 
to note how the initial post-communist contest can affect economic policy. It is also 
important to note that corruption has been minimal in Estonia. This has helped to 
legitimize the regime. 
It appears that Estonia's mode of transition was transplacement. This method of 
bargaining between the Supreme Council and the Congress of Estonia, the opposition 
legislature, helped create the Estonian Constitution. This allowed for both former 
communists and reformers to have an impact on the creation of the constitution. This 
limited both communists and reformers abilities to create radical policies that could 
negatively influence the potential Estonian democracy. No political parties were 
outlawed and the creation of the electoral laws seems to bode well for consolidation. 
Latvia 
Like Estonia, Latvia has experienced success in consolidating its new democratic 
regime. Latvia has had success in the matters of economic growth and stabilization yet 
not as substantial as Estonia. The restrictive citizenship law and slower growth rates 
appear to be two factors that have made the consolidation of the ethnic Russian minority 
more difficult in Latvia. Consolidation of the ethnic Russians has progressed in Latvia 
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and further integration appears to be on the ho1izon, a<; more ethnic Russians become 
citizens. 
The first Latvian Saeima (parliamentary) elections took place on June 5-6, 1993. 
The result was the election of a coalition government composed of two parties. It was 
composed of a centrist party and a right wing party. The winner of the initial post-
communist political contest also appears to have influenced the speed of privatization. 
The coalition of these two parties sought to privatize quickly, yet not at the same rate of 
speed as_ the Estonian government. Latvia was the second fastest to privatize its 
economy. Even though Latvia privatized very quickly, corruption has been a problem. 
These high levels of corruption do not necessarily damage the legitimacy of the regime 
but they do not help it either. Yet, the high levels of corruption that Latvia has 
demonstrated are cause for concern. It can be argued that this shows that government 
officials have not completely adapted to the new democratic system. Improvement in the 
area has been slow but lowering the levels of corruption should have a positive impact on 
the continuing consolidation of the Latvian regime. 
The Latvian method of transition also would appear to be transplacement. The 
transition process was filled with bargaining between the Supreme Council and an 
opposition group called the Latvian's Citizens' Committee over the new Latvian 
Constitution. Bargaining between the two groups took place and the end results was the 
re-instatement of the 1922 Latvian Constitution (Plakans, 1997). One of the key issues in 
the bargaining process was the outlawing of communist, fascist, and other parties that are 
anti-constitutional. The outlawing of ethnic paities appears to a negative (Latvia does not 
do this) but the outlawing of anti-constitutional parties appears to have a slight stabilizing 
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effect on the pany system. Cnlike some ottier fo1mcr communist countries constitutions, 
the basic tenants of the Latvian Constitution are democratic. Like Estonia, the citizenship 
law has caused problems with the ethnic Russians. 
Lithuania 
Like the previous two Baltic States, Lithuania has successfully consolidated its 
democratic government. When compared to the other two, economic growth and reform 
was slightly retarded by less ambitious privatization schemes. Even though rapid 
privatization of the economy was instituted slower than the other two Baltic States, recent 
economic growth and stabilization have taken place. Unlike the other Baltic States, 
Lithuania has had no real problem with ethnic strife. This may be attributed to 
Lithuania's relaxed citizenship law. The biggest palt of the law that has helped with 
ethnic consolidation was that it contained the "zero option." This allowed for persons 
who had lived and worked in Lithuania to become citizens within two years (Krickus, 
1997). 
The winner of the initial post-communist political contest appears to have 
influenced the speed of privatization. In February 2003, the election of the former 
communist party appears to have a taken a toll on the speed of privatization in Lithuania. 
Unlike the two previous Baltic States, which elected right wing and/or centrists parties 
into power, the Lithuanian people elected a left-wing party into power. With former 
communists in power, rapid privatization did not occur. Major privatization efforts did 
not start until after the former communists left power. Also, corruption has been a major 
problem in Lithuania. Until very recently, very little positive ground was being made 
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dealing with the high le\'cls of corruption. Recent progress has \>een encouraging but 
more progress needs to be made to continue democratic consolidation. 
Like in the previous two cases, Lithuania's method of transition would appear to 
be transplacement as well. The former communists and many members from Sajudis, 
especially Landsbergis, worked together to create the Lithuanian Constitution. No 
political parties are outlawed and ethnic based parties are encouraged to work within the 
political system. This appears to demonstrate a good understanding of minority rights 
and democratic values. 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria has had some successes in consolidating its democratic regime but 
several problems exist that need to be addressed before Bulgaria's democracy can be 
truly considered consolidated. Some of these problems consist of a lack of an 
independent media, inconsistencies in the rule of law, and ethnic strife. Major problems 
in corruption also loom large for Bulgaria but this does not appear to be as serious as 
other issues mentioned. Some of the problems that can be attributed to a lack of an 
independent media can be derived from slow privatization in this area. Inconsistencies in 
the rule of law and ethnic strife appear to problems with the constitution or corruption. 
This Constitution was largely democratic but contained language potentially restrictive of 
freedom of speech and minority organization (Munck and Leff, 1997). 
Once again, the winner of the initial post-communist political contest appears to 
have influenced the speed of privatization. The former communist party won the initial 
post-communist political contest. Privatization was not priority for the left wing party. It 
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can be argued that since the former communists won the initial political contest. 
privatization suffered. Even when a \Veak coalition of non-communists \\On the second 
election, the former communists still had significant political influence (Crampton, 
1997). The coalition could never enact significant privatization policies due to differences 
in economic priorities. The power of the former communists was strong in Bulgaria and 
it appears that privatization suffered. With slow and inconsistent privatization, the 
economic situation has suffered. Corruption has also been a problem in Bulgaria. This 
has been that in the past, elected officials enjoyed many special privileges during the 
privatization process. Also, corrupt political officials have wielded political power to 
avoid prosecution (Munck and Leff, 1997). These rules set by the former communist 
party have lead to several undemocratic norms in the Bulgarian government. All of 
these issues appear to have had a negative affect on democratic consolidation. 
Bulgaria's mode of transition appears to take place from above, or transformation. 
This revolution from above has spawned a pattern of elite interaction that is unacceptable 
to democracy values. This has ultimately slowed the consolidation effort in Bulgaria. 
The former communists in Bulgaria were instrumental in the creation of the constitution 
and many of these rules set by the former communist party have lead to several 
undemocratic norms in the Bulgarian government. As mentioned before, the constitution 
contained language potentially restrictive of freedom of speech and minority 
organization. Also, with regards to the problems with ethnic strife, there is a law that 
claims that citizens do not have a right to form parties based on ethnic, religious, or racial 
principals. Despite this law a Bulgarian Turk party has been allowed to remain in the 
political system while other ethnic parties have been disbanded. The mode of transition 
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allowed for the former communists to dominate the constitutional process. This in tum 
appears to have had a negative impact on the democratic values instilled in the 
consti tu ti on. 
Romania 
Like Bulgaria, Romania has had some success in consolidating its democratic 
regime but several problems exist that need to be addressed before Romania's democracy 
can be considered consolidated. One pressing matter for Romanian democratic 
consolidation is that violence is seen as an acceptable way of expressing political beliefs. 
Another problem in Romania involves the weak opposition to the former communists. 
The Romanian regime has materialized into a one-party dominant system. Another major 
problem in Romania has to do with rampant political corruption. The severity of it may 
hurt the legitimacy of the regime. "Corruption is probably the most significant political 
issue currently under active political debate (Nations in Transit, 2002, p. 324)." Ethnic 
conflict has not been a significant problem in Romania. 
The former communists in Romania organized and won the initial elections in 
1990 and the leadership of this party maintained control of the Romanian government 
until 1996. It appears that this had a significant impact on the speed of privatization. The 
former communists controlled the government in Romanian politics for the first six years 
and continue to use force after they lost the 1996 election. When compared to the other 
four countries, Romania has been the slowest to privatize its major industries. It appears 
that the winner of the initial election has a significant impact on the privatization process. 
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Corruption has been such a problem in Romania that it affects the legitimacy of the 
regime. For Romania to continue to consolidate its regime, this issue must be addressed. 
There is still a debate over Romania's mode of transition. It appears that the 
former communists used the rupture of system as a tool and hijacked the revolution. 
They used the violent revolution as tool for their coup da'te. After this, they had more 
power than any other contending party. This led to a very similar situation that took 
place in Bulgaria and had similar results. The communists set up the system and were 
very slow to reform. Violence, corruption and other non-democratic means are seen as 
normal ways to achieve political ends. The mode of transition allowed the former 
communists an extreme amount of influence in the Romanian Constitution. The 
Romania Constitution grants a wide range of powers to the president. This may have a 
negative effect on consolidation since checks and balances between the executive and 
legislative branches appear to be unstable. Further, it created acceptable norms for 
violence to solve political problems. This type of transitions appears to have a negative 
affect on democratic consolidation. 
Conclusion 
After examining these three variables it does appear that economic conditions, 
transitional factors and electoral rules do influence democratic consolidation. Further 
investigation demonstrates a strong correlation between the winner of the initial post-
communist political contest and the speed of privatization. In Estonia, a coalition of three 
right wing parties led to rapid privatization. In Latvia, the result was the election of a 
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coalition government composed of two patties. It \Vas wrnposed of a centrist party and a 
right wing party. The speed of privatization was not as fast as Estonia but was still 
significantly quicker than Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania who elected left wing, 
former communist leaders into power. It can be argued that Lithuania privatized faster 
than both Balkan States since many of the former communists that were elected were 
reformists. Bulgaria has had slightly more success in privatizing its regime than Romania 
since the opposition to the former communists is stronger. 
The mode of transition also appears to have a significant impact on consolidation. 
It appears that it has a direct impact on the creation of the new political "rules of the 
game" by which the political leaders play. Bargaining in the Baltic States created a solid 
foundation for democratic growth. Political manipulation and corruption were 
established earlier in both Balkan States as an accepted way to work within the new 
system. In Romania, the use of violence during the transition has also set a precedent for 
the new regime, which has been detrimental to the consolidation effort. 
As I briefly demonstrated in this chapter, many of these variables show signs of 
possible inter-connectedness. Two examples of this appear to be the winner of the initial 
post-communist contest and speed of privatization and the other example involves the 
mode of transition and constitutional rules. By no means do these two examples 
encompass the full range of interconnected variables, yet they do illustrate how these 
variables may influence one another. To examine this interplay between variables is 
beyond the scope of this paper but the correlations between these variables in this case 
study demonstrates the need for future research in these areas. 
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Understanding what facilitates democratic consolidation is of significant 
importance in the world today. Not only do democracies appear to have better relations 
with one another but they also bring economic growth and stability. With this in mind, it 
is important to understand how these aspiring nations can consolidate their regimes. It 
appears that economic factors, transitional factors, and electoral rules can all influence 
how quickly and thoroughly a regime consolidates. 
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